Recommendations for policing political manifestations in Europe

GODIAC – Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe

With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union
European Commission- Directorate-General Home Affairs
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Preface

This booklet on recommendations for policing political manifestations in Europe forms part of the ‘Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe’ (GODIAC) project. The booklet is one of four documents produced by the GODIAC project. The other documents include a handbook on the user-focused peer-review evaluation method, a researcher anthology and ten individual field study reports.

The purpose of the project was to identify and spread good practice in relation to dialogue and communication as strategic principles in managing and preventing public disorder at political manifestations in order to uphold fundamental human rights and to increase public safety at these events in general. The overall idea of the project has been to integrate operative police work, research and training within the field and to build international and institutional networks.

The main target group for the booklet is police commanders, researchers and trainers that come in to contact with and police political manifestations.

The project co-ordinator was the Swedish National Police Board. There were twenty partner organisations in twelve European countries. These consisted of twelve police organisations and eight research/educational organisations.

The project ran between 1st August 2010 until 31st July 2013 with grateful financial support provided by the Prevention and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Commission-Directorate-General Home Affairs and the Swedish National Police Board.

Our aim and aspiration is that the material produced by the project will serve as a contribution towards a European approach on how to police crowds and political manifestations through effective dialogue and communication.

Stockholm in May 2013

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The GODIAC Project

This report summarises the field study results of the project ‘Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe’ (GODIAC). The overall idea was to integrate operative police work, research and training within the field and to build international and institutional networks, ensuring and recognising the responsibilities of the organisers.

The purpose of the GODIAC project was to contribute to the development of a European approach to policing political manifestations.

The strategic objectives of the GODIAC project were:

- Analyse and disseminate good practices of applying research-based principles focusing on communication and dialogue as strategic principles for de-escalation and prevention of public order disturbances at political manifestations in Europe.
- Increase knowledge on the social identities of demonstrators and activists, their motivation, mobility and strategies.
- Stimulate the use of research-based knowledge in policing political manifestations.
- Promote evaluation of policing major events at a European level.
- Stimulate lessons to be learnt, disseminated and used nationally and internationally.
- Develop institutional co-operation and networks at a European level between practitioners, researchers and trainers.
- Facilitate collaboration between law enforcement agencies and research networks.

Dialogue and communication

GODIAC’s focus on dialogue and communication drew upon recent, partly parallel, partly interrelated, developments in both public order research and modern approaches to public order policing. It is vastly recognised that crowd events are encounters between groups, and the way in which the participating groups interact with one another substantially influences the outcome. Taking cognisance of this, a number of police forces began to incorporate communication into their strategic approach for public order events and, accordingly, have developed tactics implementing this strategy. This may involve the deployment of specific dialogue units up through communication training of entire riot police units. The aim of the project was to collect such approaches in different European countries and to help work towards a common – communication-based – approach to public order policing of major events.

1 This publication reflects the views only of the field study group, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Examples of good practice were identified through studies around political manifestations and demonstrations in nine countries and ten different locations between November 2010 and October 2012 in Wendland, Lisbon, Vienna, London, Barcelona, Budapest, Aarhus, Bratislava, Stockholm and Liverpool (table 1). For each observation, a field study team was composed from a pool of police commanders, dialogue police officers, researchers, trainers and legal referents from the different partner organisations. The observers had been trained in the user-focused peer-review evaluation method that explicitly draws on the involvement of intended users (below).

The peer review method
The data was collected using the peer review approach introduced by Adang and Brown (2008). Peer reviews comprise observations in real time and a focus on the handling of events. A main feature of this approach is to bring together public order researchers and police practitioners in the observation of an event and—in doing so—to instigate mutual learning. The ‘peer aspect’ refers to fact that it is carried out in the sense of a review by colleagues from other police organisations that are dealing with similar problems in their own work. An important feature is the voluntary character of a peer review because it will take place only if the police organisation asks for it (Adang & Brown, 2008; Schreiber & Adang, 2009).

Within the GODIAC project, field study groups were set up to study events, comprising seven to ten members, which included a field study coordinator and were further divided into pairs for the study. The ideal pair was made up of a police officer and a researcher. Field studies worked according to an evaluation plan based on GODIAC goals, the EU handbook (EU 2010) and issues raised by the host force. Upon arrival at the study location, the host force provided information about ‘their’ event. The group then developed an observation and interview plan, observed the event and conducted interviews with participants, officers and other interested parties (table 2).

Further information regarding the projects experiences on conducting field studies can be found in the field study handbook.

### Overview of the GODIAC field studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CASTOR Transport Wendland</td>
<td>6-7 November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>NATO summit Lisbon</td>
<td>19-21 November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>The WKR Ball Vienna</td>
<td>30 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>TUC March for the Alternative London</td>
<td>26 March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Catalonian National Day Barcelona</td>
<td>11 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>National Day Budapest</td>
<td>23 October 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>European Counter Jihad meeting Aarhus</td>
<td>31 March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Dúhový pochod – Rainbow pride march Bratislava</td>
<td>9 June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Global Counter Jihad meeting Stockholm</td>
<td>4 August 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Cairde Na hÉireann parade Liverpool</td>
<td>13 October 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview of the field studies
The next two days were spent discussing, analysing and reviewing the observations and completing a draft report. This was further worked on by the co-ordinator. The report was then circulated to participants in the field study, so they could check for accuracy; any comments were referred to the co-ordinator, who then completes the final report, prior to a feedback meeting with a host force.

### List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Demonstrators$^2$</th>
<th>Stewards/private security</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Others$^3$</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CASTOR Transport Wendland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO summit Lisbon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>The WKR Ball Vienna</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC March for the Alternative London</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>Catalonian National Day Barcelona</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian National Day Budapest</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Counter Jihad meeting Aarhus</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Rainbow Pride March Bratislava</td>
<td>11$^4$</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Counter Jihad meeting Stockholm</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caïrdë Na hÉireann parade Liverpool</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
<td><strong>231</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>503</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: List of interviews conducted during the GODIAC field studies.

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2 Including organisers.
3 E.g., Legal observers, Red Cross.
4 Seven of which refused the conversation.
The current report

The ten field studies were documented in their respective field study reports. Each report contained a description of the project and the method used, detailed information on the context of the event, including the protesters, legal issues and the intended police operation, the findings and conclusions.

Part one – Field study summaries
Drawing upon these reports, this booklet is specifically intended to serve as a document that can be used for planning and training of police operations around demonstrations and large scale events in general. It provides ten short summaries of the reports, each of them with a description of the background and context of the event, risks that had been identified by the police, the intended police operation and an outline of the course of events.

Part two – Recommendations
The second part of this booklet contains a list of recommendations for the policing of demonstrations and political manifestations; these had been derived out of the examples of good practice for dialogue and communication identified in the field studies.
1. Castor Transport, Wendland

**Background and Context**

CASTOR is an acronym for ‘cask for storage and transportation of radioactive material’. The casks are used to transport highly radioactive nuclear waste on trains and trucks. Such transports take place at least every two years between La Hague in France and the village of Gorleben in northern Germany. They have been carried out since 1984 and were – since then – accompanied by massive protests from locals and national and international groups and organisations. Some expressed objections to the transport, to the storage site or to nuclear power itself; others aimed to hinder the transport directly. In 2010, for the first time, coalitions of several activist groups called for mass *schottern* (undermining the rail tracks by removing gravel). The Internet was an important tool for mobilisation, providing infrastructural and organisational information as well as training—for instance, instructions for sit-down blockades on both the rail tracks and roads and instructions for undermining the tracks.

For the 2010 protest, 62 assemblies were registered, of which 56 were confirmed. Two were prohibited, although one prohibition was repealed by the Higher Administrative Court in Lüneburg, and two events did not fall under the law of assembly. Huge media interest accompanied the 2010 transport; 800 journalists were accredited.

**Risks according to the police**

The huge attendance expected at this event presented a specific risk, because any well-coordinated action involving a large number of participants would make it possible for protesters to outnumber the police and thus hinder their ability to ensure the security of the CASTOR transport. Risks related to *specific groups* included the Rebel Clown Army, groups of mainly young males aiming for trouble and autonomous groups that might take violent action against police. Risks related to *specific actions* included removing gravel from the rail tracks, undermining roads, blockading rails and roads with tractors or logs, specific blockades with people chaining themselves to the tracks or to concrete items in the road, and the destruction of railway and roads, for example, clamps on rails or spikes on roads to destroy police tires.

**Police operation**

The police operation was led by a joint command of the Police Authority of Lüneburg, responsible for all issues around the operation, and the vice president of the federal police, especially responsible for trains and tracks. The command was supported by the ‘creative team’ of police officers and social scientists who acted as a think tank/consulting body and supported teams of police officers that acted as conflict management (KM) teams in the field. Deployed were 8,156 federal police officers and 5,091 from the police of Lower Saxony, supplemented by 6,745 officers from state police forces that had been requested from 13 federal states. The total number of officers amounted to 19,992.

The goals of the police operation were to:

- Ensure the CASTORs were safely brought to the interim storage in Gorleben
- Facilitate peaceful demonstrations
- Reduce the effects of the transport as much as possible for the inhabitants of the region and strive to return the region to a state of normality

Demonstrators at the Wendland field study
Several months before the current CASTOR transport, the conflict managers (KM) assisted in introducing police leaders to protest organisers to build trusting relations. The police also had informed the organisers at meetings and through the media that peaceful demonstrations would be facilitated, but that criminal acts, like undermining roads and tracks, would be acted on. The head of the Conflict Management Unit also had eleven meetings with police commanders to inform them about the demonstrator groups and the operational activities of the conflict managers.

Thirty conflict managers were deployed in pairs of one officer from the federal police and the other from the state police; they were identifiable by their red vests. The KM teams were managed through the Head of Conflict Management staff in the Joint Command and acted in accordance with the field commanders or the joint command. The specific tasks of KM teams in the field involved creating rational encounters between police and protesters and enabling transparency by explaining police action and intervention. Their work was carried out in close connection with the local commander. The KM teams provided advice to the commander or carried out negotiations in his or her name.

Two information points were provided for the public and the demonstrators, staffed with conflict managers, and there was a free-of-charge telephone number for enquiries from the public.

Before the event, each police officer was given a booklet from the Joint Command. It explained the background of the transport and the protest, the goals of the operation and the potential tactics of the protesters. It stressed how important the consequent and professional behaviour of the police was. The command emphasised the willingness to communicate, the proportionality of means, differentiated interventions and stressed the need to explain actions as much as possible, making policing transparent and understandable.

Lower Saxony police ran a public Internet site with information about the CASTOR transport. Amongst other information, it included standards and expectations in relation to protest. A forum was also provided for participants to ask questions and to discuss several issues. The police, in all involving 50 officers, would deploy eight teams of information officers with loudspeaker systems in the field. It was the first time this system had been used. The internal communication was also considered important. Ten thousand police officers would get an update over the police radio every half hour during the operation.

Before the transport, the police also contacted the local inhabitants because their everyday lives could be disrupted by, for instance, traffic problems.

The Course of events

The transport of the eleven atomic waste containers started in France on the afternoon of 5 November 2010. On Saturday 6 November, a ‘kick-off’ demonstration took place on a field 2 kilometres from the reloading place in Dannenberg. The rally started at 13.00 hours and was attended by 25,000 people according to police and 50,000 according to the organisers. There was a festive atmosphere during the rally. Police maintained a low profile, but were lined up close by with many platoons of riot police. One incident occurred when activists dug a hole, trying to undermine part of one of the roads that potentially would be used to transport the CASTORS to Gorleben by trucks. Several platoons of riot police intervened, and there were some confrontations with participants of the black block. Otherwise, the rally stayed peaceful, including some sit-down blockades at the end, during which the police co-operated with the protesters to resolve the situations.

As the transport got closer, the following day was filled with different activities along the rail tracks, in the forest surrounding the tracks and on the roads, aimed at hindering the transport. Actions took place in the whole Wendland area, with most inci-
dents occurring around Leitstade, Harlingen and Gorleben. Protestors used different tactics. There were many sit-down blockades ranging from smaller groups up to thousands of people. Tractors effectively blocked the roads, and the protesters brought sheep onto the tracks. In many places protestors, in order to undermine the railway, took away gravel from the rail tracks. Thousands of people stayed around in the woods and regrouped on the tracks. The police had problems reaching different places along the tracks because of the roadblocks.

The train reached its first interim station around 09.25 hours on Monday, 8 November in Dannenberg, where the containers were unloaded from the train and placed onto trucks. Many protestors stayed on through the nights by the rails and roads, although the temperature was close to zero degrees. Police officers were brought in from other areas to reinforce the police deployment.

The interaction between the police and the protestors differed. The police let the protesters stay in the sit-down blockades. As the train came closer, the police informed them that they had to leave, which some did. Many hundreds had to be carried away from the tracks. At some places this occurred under calm conditions by mutual agreement between the police and the protesters. In other situations, there were conflicts, especially as the transport got closer. Several violent confrontations then occurred between the police and activists along the tracks when the activists tried to get through the police line and take away gravel from the tracks. The police used pepper spray, batons and a water cannon to keep the protesters away from the tracks. One police truck was set on fire.

In all, 131 officers were reported injured, 78 of which were due to actions from protestors, the remaining of which occurred without involvement of others. Whilst there is no official figure of how many protestors were affected, the organisers have claimed that up to a thousand people were injured by pepper spray, batons and other coercive measures used by the police (FazNet, 2010; Spiegel online, 2010; Der Westen, 2010).

Eight persons were arrested, 172 criminal prosecutions were instigated, of which 15 were because of a violation of the law of assembly. The police took 1,316 persons into preventive custody, issued 306 local bans and confiscated 117 tractors.

2. NATO Summit, Lisbon

**Background and context**

The NATO Summit took place at Parque das Nações Pavilhão da FIL, a commercial area near a bus, subway and train station, a casino, hotels, business centres and residential buildings. On the margin of the NATO Summit there were also bilateral high-level meetings, such as the Russia/NATO meeting, the EU/USA meeting, the EU/NATO meeting, the Young Atlanticist Summit meeting, and the like. Seventy delegations and many high-level representatives—heads of state and government—were present at the summit. Among the participating delegations were the 28 member states of NATO, Russia and seven North African countries. During the past ten years a number of high-profile international meetings, such as NATO Summits, G8, World Trade Organisation, and International Monetary Fund, have been the objects of violent protest.

Prior to this summit, an anti-NATO campaign was launched under the name ‘PAZ SIM! NATO NÃO!’ (Peace yes! NATO no!). The campaign started on 6 October and culminated in the demonstrations on 20 November. Organized by the Portuguese Communist Party and the Peace Yes! NATO No! participants included War Resisters International (WRI), Attac, Pagan, the black block and the Rebel Clown Army. Altogether 104 organisations were said to participate in the campaign. The police anticipated a peaceful event with around 30,000 demonstrators. The organisers sought international support, which was forth-
coming from organisations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

Risks according to the police
Risks related to locations/hot-spot areas were:
- The summit venue: This would attract demonstrators and protestors who could potentially breach security and enter the venue
- Hotels: high numbers of delegates staying in numerous hotels
- Routes: protestors blocking access to venues
- Symbolic targets
- Transport infrastructure
- The city: disruptions to residential and business communities

The demonstration on 20 November took place at Avenida de Liberdade, one of Lisbon’s biggest avenues. Some international and luxury shops are located along the avenue, as well as five-star hotels. Risks included identified activists and groups including black block affiliates, Spanish Islamic extremists, and radical extremists.

Police operation
The event was policed by Public Security Police (PSP). Between 2000 and 2004, in the preparation for UEFA 2004, police underwent training to develop a consistent approach to policing major events. This training centred on a firm and friendly style of policing. The level of intervention was determined according to a dynamic risk assessment for each situation. For normal situations, the police deployment would consist of regular police officers. Their main task was to support the general public, provide useful information, mediate minor conflict situations, engage in dialogue and communicate with the demonstrators. Minor incidents would be dealt with by patrol cars with three officers, increasing to small teams of eight officers if necessary. These officers were not to use heavy equipment. They would have access to public-order protective equipment.

The next level of escalation would involve special police units (riot police), in the event of major disturbances. Critical incidents would be handled by all police units, from patrol officers to SWAT teams, dependent on tactics including batons, tear gas, dog units, horse units, a water cannon, armoured vehicles, and the like.

The police operation during the NATO summit comprised 7,000 police officers, mainly from the PSP and the Lisbon Metropolitan Police but also from the Special Police Unit (riot police), SWAT teams, dog units, riot police, police units for close protection and police forces coming from other police districts. There were no specific functions for dialogue or communication.
According to the National Police Commissioner’s guidelines the goal of the operation was:

- To protect delegations during their presence in Portugal
- To permit the Summit to take place (developing security measures in order to install several perimeters around the Summit venue, access control and checkpoints)
- To maintain public order in Lisbon to ensure compliance with Human Rights provisions and maintain the integrity of iconic sites/vulnerable locations
- To avoid unwanted behaviour

The main concern and focus of the police was the security of the international VIPs and delegates. Demonstrations and other forms of protest were a secondary concern.

Lisbon was divided into different zones and safety areas, in order to protect the NATO summit. Three perimeters were established: the first one was red (restricted entrance for accredited persons), the second was yellow (checkpoints to control persons and vehicles) and the third was green (surveillance, control and information).

Prior to the event, Lisbon Metropolitan Police tried to inform the citizens who lived and worked inside the perimeter about the safety areas by using mainly the mass media and face-to-face communication. The Lisbon Metropolitan Police also developed and made use of a plan to communicate with neighbourhood and shop owners’ associations about those plans.

Course of events

A NATO Counter Summit was arranged between 19 and 21 November at the Luís de Camões High School in the centre of Lisbon by the No to NATO organisations with the support of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Stiftung Friedensbewegung and DIE LINKE, Germany.

On the morning of 20 November 2010 there was a blockade close to the summit venue. Thirty-eight people had chained themselves together; the police removed and arrested them. The action was organised by unions (Intersindical and CGTP IN) linked with the communist party.

At 13.00 hours people began to assemble at the starting point of the demonstration, Praça Marquês de Pombal. There were some plainclothes officers, traffic officers, and ordinary police in groups of three. Groups of demonstrators arrived, carrying red flags and banners. These were mostly middle-aged and older people from the communist party and trade unions. The demonstration stewards had red vests on. People arrived in busses, and some gathered at the statue by the roundabout; these now included young activists.

At 13.45 hours twelve police intervention vehicles with emergency lights on, together with two ambulances, made a circuit of the rally point. More demonstrators arrived, carrying flags and banners. Plain-clothes officers mixed with the demonstrators, and a police helicopter passed overhead.

At 14.50 hours chanting and dancing clowns came marching towards the rally point. They were quickly encircled by the riot police, as were young persons, presumed to be from the black block.

At 15.20 hrs the authorised demonstration with members of the communist party and trade unions started to march, accompanied by ordinary police on both sides. The identified activists, red clowns and other protestors were not allowed by the organisers or the police to enter the demonstration. They were enclosed by riot police who had their protective helmets on. This group then formed a second demonstration, with clowns, the supposed black block and other protestors, which was kept separate, with no one allowed to enter or leave. The group was escorted by riot police with helmets on. There were many stops during the march in order to keep the two demonstrations apart.
At 17.15 hours, the second demonstration reached the final rally point, a square at Praça dos Restauradores. People from the first demonstration had remained on the square and tried to join the second one but were not allowed to do so by the police. The second demonstration then came to a standstill. Two lines of police officers divided the demonstrations and were later withdrawn. Although many demonstrators began to run from the place, the situation remained generally calm during the rest of the evening. Small groups of protestors remained in the area, but according to the police, only 18,000 persons took part in the demonstrations, rather than the expected 30,000.

3. The WKR Ball, Vienna

Background and context
The Wiener Korporationsball has been held annually since 18 January 1952 at Wiener Hofburg, Vienna’s Emperors Castle. Approximately 2,000 guests and participants from all over Europe attend. It is organised by the Vienna Ring of Corporations (WKR), the association of ‘coloured’ Viennese University corporations. The WKR consists of a union of 19 different student unions, ranging from conservative to the far right. The organisers regard the ball as the annual highlight of their activities. Protests against the ball occurred for the first time in 2008. They came mainly from left- and extreme left-wing groups. Protesters argue that corporations display a link between open Neo-National Socialism and the FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich), a far-right party, including objections to the fact that ‘leading figures from the Austrian and European right wings’ would meet in one of Austria’s most representative buildings, the Hofburg (Nowkr, 2011). Similarly, representatives of the association of Vienna’s university students (ÖH) argued in an open letter to the president of Austria that at least one of the corporations is classified as ‘extreme right’ by the archive of documentation of the Austrian resistance movement (DÖW). The fact that the ball was held at the Hofburg, a location that also houses the office of the president and is deeply associated with the Republic of Austria was seen by the student organisation as a ‘scandal’. They appealed to the president to take a position and to take steps against this (OEH, 2011).

Risks according to the police
Police expected people to organise gatherings and protests against the WKR ball, in particular to try to hinder access to the ball, to perpetrate criminal acts against ball guests, and to take actions against the building or disturb the ball. Initial assembly points were regarded as possible hot spots. Criminal acts were expected against the premises of cooperation groups participating in the ball, as well as against symbolic buildings. Protestors were expected to act aggressively towards the police and very likely against ball guests. There was also an identified risk of confrontation between the so-called black block and right-wing extremists. A bicycle demonstration by a group called Pirati Cyclist Antifascisti had announced a demonstration that had not been registered officially and could become a threat to public order or traffic.

Other perceived risks were from decentralised actions of small groups as a reaction to a massive police action against demonstrators, from the perceived police support for the ball and from the possibility of reckless behaviour of ball guests.

Police operation
The leading organisation of the event was the police of Vienna, with the president of the police heading the operation. The detail was run from the operations centre at the Vienna police, working on two levels:

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5 Coloured caps and ribbons, traditional symbols, which are seldom seen today at universities, usually being worn only during ceremonial occasions.
first, the level of the authority headed by the president of the police and the management staff unit; second, the level of the operation commander and the operation staff. The staff used the NATO model, which means using different functions depending on the situation. During the event, the operation commander would gather important information from the section commanders (Silver commanders) and would present them to the Gold commander to make a decision or to find alternative solutions for police action. Dependent on the specific event, liaison officers from other authorities would be working within the operational staff—for example, from the traffic system, fire brigade, and rescue services like the Red Cross. This measure was taken in order to have direct contact and to hasten and facilitate decision making.

For the policing of the WKR ball, 1,300 officers were deployed, most of them coming from the home force of Vienna plus supporting units from the states Burgenland, Styria and Lower Austria. Vienna police dispose three different units for the policing of public order events:

- The duty unit (Ordnungsdiensteinheit)
- The crowd control unit (Einsatzeinheit), which is deployed at major events. They are better trained and more experienced
- Vienna’s special riot unit, known as the WEGA (Wiener Einsatzgruppe Alarmabteilung), the unit most experienced in crowd events

According to the operational order, Vienna police set the following goals for this event:

- Preventing a demonstration marching towards the inner city and the Hofburg area
- Ensuring safe access and departure of visitors to the ball on the routes that have been agreed on with the organisers
- Preventing fights/disputes between fraternity members/visitors to the ball and demonstrators
- Preventing damage to property at the place of the event and at identified locations as well as to vehicles in the surrounding streets
- Minimising disturbances of public and individual transport.

Because no demonstration was officially taking place, police had two expectations of what demonstrators would do. First, they assumed that demonstrators would assemble and march in a large crowd from the old hospital or from the inner city to try to reach the protected area. A second scenario was that the demonstrators would work in small groups, try to assemble in the outer areas and try to split the police units apart. In this case the police would use mobile units and manage deployments.

Vienna police apply a ‘3D strategy’, which encompasses a three-level approach. Dialogue, the first D, plays a major role. The first step for a good dialogue happens in the preparation for an event; prior to the event, police identify relevant persons and make first contact. During the event, the police maintain close contact and an on-going communication. Whilst there is no specific dialogue unit for this task, each officer is expected to engage in communication with the participants. The contact with key persons is seen as the particular task of the head of a unit. In the case of emerging risk, the second level, de-escalation, is introduced to manage the risk, and – if necessary – the third D, direct action, to determine the measures, will be used.

The course of events

From 15.00 hours there was a continuous enhancement of police presence and preparations, including setting up fences at the restricted area and controlling strategically important access points. Around 16.20 hours approximately 120 persons held a demonstration at Stephansplatz, in the city centre that was

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6 In order to establish the same policing approach during the EURO 2008, the two hosting countries Austria and Switzerland, agreed on the joint so-called 3D strategy. Since then this strategy has been part of the policing of major events in Austria.
related to the situation in Egypt. The situation there was calm. At 17.00 hours the restricted area around the Hofburg was completely enforced, and the area was no longer open to the public. Further, police set up barricades at the streets leading to the ball. During the following hour, police presence in the city centre and in particular within the area between university campuses, the old AKH (general hospital) and the Hofburg increased. At several locations police were deployed behind a line of fences. Police controlled movement through the barricades. The overall picture was that there were more police present than citizens.

From 17.00 hours, more and more people gathered at the old AKH. Groups of possible demonstrators (between 5 and 10 persons) walked in the city centre, apparently searching for the demonstration. There was little participation by ‘normal’ citizens. At most locations it was very quiet. The police presence was very high, with police barriers almost everywhere. Citizens seemed unconcerned about the large police presence, there were no traffic jams, and everything seemed to be going on as normal. Despite the prohibition, two bigger groups managed to gather. Around 18.00 hours police reported around 150 demonstrators at Mariahilfer Street and the Museum of Fine Arts. At the same time, another group of about 100 to 200 persons assembled at Mariahilfer Street (a shopping area). Few police were present; a shop window of H&M was smashed.

At 18.50 hours 150 people assembled at Gürtel Street, carrying red flags, some of the communist party, some of Che Guevara. The crowd blocked the traffic for 2 to 3 minutes and then dispersed, running off.

According to the police, 200 to 250 people walked later in Westbahnstraße. When they passed a police station, a few threw small objects like beer cans. More units arrived; the crowd was stopped but remained calm. About 150 persons were contained, their personal data was taken and then they were free to leave.

At 19.00 hours the first ball guests and organis-

ers arrived at the Hofburg. The situation remained stable, and at 20.50 hours the water cannon was removed.

At 21.15 hours about 20 cyclists gathered close to the Burgtheater building, opposite city hall. About five police vans with flashing lights on came at high speed to that area, stopped traffic and turned into the place where the bikes were. The groups of cyclists split up and rode away in both northern and southern directions. The police cars stopped, and officers stopped a group of 5 to 10 persons without bikes who were left standing there. The police interviewed them for several minutes, checked their identification, and told them they were then free to leave. Along the road there were several cars with officers doing the same thing.

Police reported ten bins damaged, a shop window smashed, and medium damage to a police car. Vienna police made four arrests and checked the identities of 272 persons.

4. The TUC March, London

Background and context

The TUC March for the Alternative was organised by the Trade Union Congress in direct response to the austerity measures introduced by the coalition
government. The initial expected numbers of participants in the demonstration was around 150,000, which would make the March for the Alternative the largest event in the UK for the last decade. Policing of the event was planned and executed by the Metropolitan Police Service in London. Protest at the March for the Alternative aimed to unite those affected by the government’s plans and to point out possible alternatives to the ‘there is no alternative’ policy of the current government. Beyond groups organised under the TUC umbrella, there were a number of single issue protest groups with different goals and tactics. Some groups organised feeder marches that would start from various locations in the City of London and then join the main march. The TUC distanced themselves from any such planning involving other protest groups.

Non-violent direct actions were announced by UK Uncut, a non-violent aggregation against the cuts, engaging in ‘bail-ins’, a sort of direct-action protest against businesses that were accused of not paying taxes. Occupations have often been focused upon specific issues including the National Health Service and libraries. UK Uncut sees such activities as more effective than mere marches. For 26 March, UK Uncut called to ‘Occupy for the Alternative’, using Twitter and the UK Uncut blog (UK Uncut, 2011) to organise demonstrators. From 14.00 hours to 15.30 hours flash mobs, bail ins and occupations were set to close down different banks and alleged ‘tax dodgers’; the majority of the targets were located in and around Oxford Street.

There was intense media focus, due not only to the size of the event but also as a result of recent incidents at public order events that had taken place in London—namely the G20 protest in April 2009 and incidents that occurred following the student protests in November and December 2010, particularly in relation to the police use of force and containment tactics.

Risks according to the police
Officers were warned about potential protestor tactics, including small breakaway groups diverting officers from their deployments. Officers were briefed to balance safety with operational requirements, complete dynamic risk assessments and consider options. Officer safety advice was given regarding the use of shields. Attention was to be paid to protestors’ attempts to break officers’ arms by grabbing their shields and using them like a steering wheel.

Different tactics of protest groups were described including the use of padding, shields and helmets. It was expected that protesters would use face coverings and uniformed clothing, called a ‘black block’ tactic. Some groups were likely to engage in ‘surging’, where...
that part of the crowd stops and then suddenly starts running forward. They might not commit any violence but likely would cause some trouble in doing so.

**Police operation**

Strategic goals of the police operation were to:
- Facilitate peaceful protest in liaison with organisers
- Maintain public order
- Prevent crime and provide appropriate responses to any offences committed
- Maintain the security of the Parliament and key government buildings
- Protect central London from any crime and disorder linked to the day's protest events
- Protect other vulnerable premises

Police officers were deployed according to their level of training and skill. Trained officers were deployed in public order protective equipment. Fluorescent vests were worn both to protect officers working in or adjacent to traffic and to assist with identification of police resources. This dress code also provided a softer image in the public domain and reinforced the policing style. This included flat caps; protective helmets were kept within a reasonable distance. A uniform appearance was stressed, and each officer had to wear the correct form of identification including rank/alphanumeric insignia on epaulettes and name badges.

The policing style for this event would be facilitative and would respect the human rights of all. ‘Untidiness was okay’ was a message given to the officers during their briefing. More precisely, it was intended that police not use their powers just to make things look tidy. In case of spontaneous marches and attempts of provocation, officers were asked to remain calm with a controlled response. Officers were not to self-deploy unless necessary. There was to be no delay in action to prevent crime, serious disorder or serious injury.

Intervention would take place only when supported by legislation and in support of the Gold strategy; it was meant to be appropriate and proportionate to the offences. Dependent upon the gravity of the offences, tactical options were to monitor and record (to consider CCTV and Evidence Gathering Teams), give warnings, issue summonses and PNDs and arrest.

While accepting ‘untidiness’, officers also would need to ‘recognise the impact on public confidence if persons are seen to engage in sustained acts of crime and disorder and the police are not seen to react’ (Silver tactical plan, 2011:7), in which case speedy intervention would need to be considered. The use of force ‘must only be used if necessary for a lawful purpose; and must be reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances’ (Ibid., p. 8). Containment would be used as an option of last resort in order to deal with actual or imminent breach of the peace or serious disorder.

All aspects of intelligence were fed through Bronze Intelligence. Key to the build-up of the intelligence picture was the deployment of Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT) and Evidence Gathering Teams (EGT). Their task was to identify individuals who might be using the event as cover for unlawful activity; further, they could give important information on the mood of the crowd and an early ‘heads up’ on emerging issues that might prompt preventative police action. Intelligence derived from these teams would inform Silver’s decision making on tactical options.

The MPS faced protestors organising themselves throughout the event by social media, by updating ‘Google maps in live time to show police deployments’ and giving advice on how to avoid containment. The police employed numerous communication methods. Recommendations had been made to:
- Create a ‘Bronze Engagement’ (a senior officer managing engagement with the community/protestors/organisers)

7 PND – Penalty Notice for disorder. A way of dealing with somebody who has committed an offence.
Introduce a strategic briefing function (ensuring most senior officers/politicians are updated)

Use social media extensively

Communication tactics involved talks before the event between the MPS and parties actively and passively involved in the event. The police further had set up a comprehensive e-communications system, involving the use of active Web-based information, Twitter, YouTube and a Web site, the commanders’ appearance on TV and radio, a joint press conference with the organisers, and embedded press. In addition, the TUC and the MPS invited the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) to observe the police planning and the actual policing of the march.

Course of events

Victoria Embankment (VE) – the gathering of the TUC march started at 09.30 hours and backed up very quickly towards Blackfriars Bridge. Total numbers assembled in VE were in the region of 250,000. The behaviour of the crowd could be described as a ‘party-like’ family environment; people were singing and dancing, which prevented stewards from getting the crowd moving. This resulted in a delay of 45 minutes before the crowd actually started to move. The march went on along the intended route without any disturbance. At 16.47 hours the end of the march passed through Piccadilly on its way to Hyde Park. A rally conducted at Hyde Park was family orientated, with music, dancing, picnics, and political speeches. The rally went according to plan and finished at 17.00 hours.

Additionally, several parallel events took place throughout the day and across central London. Feeder marches by single-issue groups joined the TUC march from different directions. From midday different groups targeted numerous locations on Oxford Street, in Soho and in Piccadilly. The targeted locations reflected to a great extent those that had been indicated on Web pages beforehand. These were mostly banks and companies that were accused of tax dodging by demonstrator groups. The actions varied from creative non-violent forms of protest, as had been carried out in previous events by UK Uncut (above), to throwing water bombs and paint bombs and smashing windows and doors. Some locations were also looted. Expensive foreign-made vehicles parked at the side of the road were also targeted and vandalised by passing demonstrators unconnected with the TUC march. At 15.30 hours around 150 activists occupied the department store Fortnum & Mason on Piccadilly. Outside the building, sporadic vandalism was targeted at the store. The activists were contained and later arrested.

Unrest and disturbances continued throughout the evening until the police managed to disperse the protesters. There were 214 people arrested, 145 of which were in connection with the incident at Fortnum & Mason. The arrests were made for a variety of offences including public order offences, criminal damage, aggravated trespass, and violent disorder. Eighty-four persons were reported injured, of which 31 were police officers.

5. Catalanian National Day, Barcelona

Background and context

The Catalan National Day on 11 September has been celebrated since 1980. The date is significant in the history of Catalonia. During the Spanish War of Succession, the city of Barcelona was forced, after a 13-month-long siege of the city, to surrender on 11 September 1714 to the French and Castilian forces. The Catalan National Day is therefore not a celebration of a victory; on the contrary, it is a commemoration of a defeat.

The National Day is commemorated by, among other events, a flower offering at the Rafael de Casanovas statue. He was one of the heroes during the 1714 siege of the city of Barcelona. The National Day is also celebrated with torch marches, concerts and demonstrations. One important place for the com-
memorations and celebrations is the square at Fossar de les Moreres, built on the graveyard where the Catalan soldiers that died in the war are buried. The profile of the 2011 event was further raised because of government reforms and constitutional changes with respect to deficit reduction. Such change is always a sensitive issue because of Spanish history (coup d’êtats, dictatorship, territorial conflicts, etc.). Finally, there was also an on-going dispute on the Catalan model of education.

Risks related to the event
The change of the constitution and the ruling of the Catalan High Court were expected to impact La Diada (the national day) in several aspects

- Stir up nationalistic and independents’ feelings
- The Catalan government, political parties, associations, and trade unions called for mobilization. The institutional acts were likely to attract a more heterogeneous group of people than just the radicalized groups. There would be not only independents present during the event, but probably a wide range of Catalan society.
- Various social movements such as anti-bullfighting, trade unions, Indignados, and the like, might take advantage of the day to promote their cause but probably would see their protests drown in the Catalan and nationalist protests.

In terms of risk of confrontations and violence, the fact that the event would be of a more heterogeneous character, with families present and so forth, the level of risk would likely be somehow reduced. Law enforcement would not be the target for protesters. The symbolism of the date itself, 11 September 2011, was also the tenth anniversary of the terrorist attacks in the United States.

Police operation
The police operation was divided into four parts:

1. The flower offering at the Casanova monument by controlled and timed access to guests and participants; patrol officers would police a secure area around the monument; riot police would be held in reserve.
2. Citadel Park, including speeches by Catalan politicians, music, a book exhibition and general public use of the facilities. Access to and from the park was to be controlled by patrol officers. An anti-riot unit was held in reserve.
3. An afternoon march authorised from the Urquinaona square to the Lluis Companys Avenue, followed by musical entertainment at the Avenue.
4. Policing an anticipated unauthorised march.

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9 The movement relates to Stéphane Hessel’s pamphlet ‘Indignes-vous’ (‘Time for outrage’ in English), which encourages opposition against financial capitalism.
Course of events
Fossar de les Moreres, 10 September: At approximately 23.10 hours around 2,000 participants attended a very organized torch march with drums and Catalonian flags. The participants were a mixed group of gender and ages. There were few police officers present. Speeches were held by several Catalans and members of youth organisations.

11 September, 08.20 hours. The area surrounding the flower offering at the Rafael de Casanovas Monument was sealed off by the police with controlled access for participants, where appropriate residents were escorted by the police to their homes. Communication between the police, residents and attendees was noticeable. VIP escorts arrived either to leave or to pick up guests.

Logistical problems occurred when a tourist bus blocked the only access, and there was no parking available for the VIP cars. Police spotters were observed on local rooftops. Some police commanders were seen mingling with VIPs within the sealed area. Guests included local politicians, dignitaries and celebrities. Officers controlling access gave people directions and helped them to find their spot. The atmosphere was friendly and relaxed, with good co-operation between groups of commemorators. Around 09.50 hours one person who was denied entrance to the sealed-off area became disruptive, and five police officers removed him from the scene. People with protest banners were visible near the checkpoint.

10.00 – 11.30 hours, Citadel Park: At the entrance to the park police randomly checked visitors’ bags. Inside the park, the police kept a low profile and there was a party and festival atmosphere. Police officers were seen patrolling the park and assisting people. Official ceremonies were taking place inside the park. After the ceremony, as VIPs left, there was some shouting at the military representatives. It was understood that this was because the military are seen as representatives of Spain.

The anticipated unauthorised demonstration began to assemble at 11.07 hours, organised by mainly socialist and communist/leftist young political organisations. A group of about 300 demonstrators left the St Jaume Square outside the city hall to march to the park. Three traffic police officers followed them on scooters in the front and in the back. Participants stated that they would march towards the Citadel Park. At the park, heavy police presence was noted; anti-riot police gathered outside and a number of vehicles kept on their emergency lights. An anti-riot police officer helped an injured man who had fallen in the street. Further police vehicles arrived with officers dressed in anti-riot helmets.

13.20 – 13.30 hours: On the demonstrators’ arrival at the park at avenue Argentina gate, fully kitted riot police officers prevented their access. Traffic was still flowing and the demonstrators then moved off towards the old town. Small numbers of officers accompanied the march. The protest group consisted of approximately 500 individuals, a mixed group regarding ages, with a small group of around 20 activists at the front of the demonstration. As the group moved towards the old town, a small number of activists climbed some scaffolding, unfolded banners and set some flares. Police did not intervene. The march then continued to the St Jaume Square, but a number of people left. On arrival of at the square, speeches were made that finished at around 13.55 hours. Protesters gathered their flags and left peacefully.

17.00 – 18.00 hours: Authorised march from Urquinaona Square to the Citadel Park: The atmosphere at the gathering point was very relaxed with mixed-age groups present, policed by local police officers with reserves close by. The march left the gathering point; some protesters used fireworks. At the front of the demonstration were two Guardia Urbana police officers, the commander and his deputy and the commander of the plainclothes police officers. A cleaning team from the local authorities immediately removed some graffiti that had been
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6. Hungarian National Day, Budapest

Background and context
The National Day on 23 October is a commemoration of the 1956 uprising against the then-ruling Hungarian communist party and the influence from the Soviet Union. The political meaning of this date is highly recognised because the new post-communist Hungary was founded on 23 October 1989.

In 2006, on the fiftieth anniversary of the uprising, a series of anti-government protests took place in Budapest and other major cities between 17 September and 23 October, some of which resulted in violent clashes between protesters and the police. The incidents were discussed in detail within the Hungarian society and became a turning point for the Hungarian police. Many changes and improvements have been made since then concerning tactics as well as equipment. Since 2007, protests against the government have accompanied the annual commemoration of the 1956 uprising.

A number of different groups and organisations held commemorations and rallies during the National Day in 2011. The two main opposing groups were Milla and Jobbik. Milla stands for ‘One Million for the Freedom of the Press in Hungary’ This grassroots movement started as a Facebook group in reaction to changes in media legislation, with the aim of defending democratic freedom and human rights. Jobbik, on the other hand, short for ‘Movement for a Better Hungary’, is a radical nationalistic party. Jobbik members are against immigration, are anti-EU and anti-NATO, and demand the introduction of compulsory religious and moral education. Segments within Jobbik also harbour anti-Semitic and anti-Roma ideas. In 2007 Jobbik formed the Gárda (Hungarian Guard, hereafter Gárda), a semi-military organisation that aimed to take part in social, civic and charity actions. This guard regularly marched through the streets in black uniforms.

Risks according to the police
Although a clash of Milla and Jobbik members would cause trouble, the risk was reduced by the timing of their respective rallies. A specific risk related to a member of the Jobbik group who had been subject to house arrest; should this individual turn up, police would need to make a decision about whether to arrest him and consider the implications of any such action.

Police operation
A strategic plan was developed utilising intelligence...
gathered by police, the national defence and the counterterrorism unit. It also contained information from earlier occasions, plus details of operation deployments, command structure and communications. The Gold commander ensured that his strategy was communicated throughout his command team. Deployments included 1,800 officers in Budapest, 1,200 in the surrounding countryside, approximately 2,000 CCTV cameras in Budapest plus a number of police-controlled mobile cameras. During the event, police monitored the Internet and social media including Facebook and Twitter.

Tactical options included as a priority:
- No open positioning of riot police units
- No fences
- Passive policing – active action only when necessary, for example, if attacked and or needed to protect individuals/groups
- Dog, mounted units, tear gas and water cannons were held in the police barracks

In line with the strategy Budapest police chose to implement the following:
- First perimeter (outer): Plainclothes officers with intelligence tasks
- Second perimeter: Riot police officers and Budapest special units arranged in mobile teams; these were the first responders.
- Third perimeter (inner): Officers in normal uniforms, white shirts, walking in pairs close to the crowd. They accompanied the march, observed and reported to the commander of the relevant section.

Officers were briefed not to provoke, not to answer if provoked and to dress in proper uniform. The aim was to show officers in normal uniform and not to provoke the crowd by using helmets, shields, and the like. The silver/bronze commanders were selected to promote these tactics, including:
- Patrol officers to police in a tolerant way, gently dealing with the crowds but with a quick response to incidents
- Demonstrations treated as normal unless the situation escalated
- Check area: Spot people with specific items
- Police had authorization to check and search, for example, for stones or petrol bombs

The riot police were in the field with six units (companies), which brought the number of officers deployed to 780 (including logistics).

Course of events
A flag ceremony took place at 9.00 hours on Parliament Square. Approximately 200–300 people attended the ceremony, among these the Prime Minister and other high-ranking persons. Policing was – at least visibly – low key with plainclothes officers and a small number of officers in normal uniform. Police officers at the location were seen talking to participants and spectators.

A Roma commemoration ceremony, scheduled to take place at 11.00 hours, had been brought forward without notification to the police.

The Milla rally took place on Szabad Sajtó utja, the ‘Road of the Free Press’ between 15.00 and 16.45 hours. A stage was set up from which speeches were held and music was played. The crowd amounted to approximately 45,000. The atmosphere was calm; participants were quiet and disciplined. Police officers in normal uniforms were deployed in groups of four or five, standing back from the crowd. There was some interaction between the police and the demonstrators. Occasionally police intervened. For example a mobile unit surrounded and searched a group of skinheads.

Shortly after the Milla rally finished, at 16.50 hours, a smaller demonstration left and walked towards the former TV building. The participants came mainly from military, police and fire department trade unions. The march was accompanied by police on all sides. Participants of the Jobbik
The demonstration crossed the demonstration without any problems, with some of their number joining in. The demonstration reached the TV house at 17.11 hours. Police officers were posted in pairs in the background, about 50 metres away from the demonstrators. Speeches were held from the stairs of the building; the crowd numbered approximately 300. Occasionally members of Jobbik passed the scene. After the speeches, people lit candles and put them on the buildings’ stairs to commemorate the wounded police officers from an earlier event. This event ended without disturbances.

The Jobbik rally took place at Józef Attila Street next to the Ministry of Finance. A stage was set up with a sign that read ‘First They Came with the Tanks – Now They Come with the Banks’. Participants arrived from 14.00 hours. Music was played. In addition, a number of people from the ‘Gárda’ were present in black uniforms. The crowd rose to about 1,000 people. Speeches started, and at 17.00 hours a concert began. Policing was low key. Plainclothes officers were deployed close by. Officers in normal uniform were openly present, although they kept their distance. Anti-riot units were not visible. Police busses were used to block the street behind the Jobbik rally, in order to separate this event from a faction of the Millə march to the TV building. The concert ended around 18.00 hours, and people assembled for a torch march, also to the TV building. The atmosphere remained calm. Police officers in normal uniform had formed a cordon around the protesters; the garda then formed a line between the police officers and the protesters. A group of people carrying large letters forming the word ‘freedom’ surrounded a police car. There was no reaction from the police. The number of protesters in the demonstration was approximately 1,000. Backup units were deployed on side streets along the route. The torch march arrived at the building at 18.47 hours.

Around 200 persons attended a rally of the Pax Hungarica Movement (a Hungarian neo fascist organisation) at Corvin Square. From 18.00 hours speeches and commemorative acts were held from the stairs of the cinema. Shortly before the start, police searched activists after CCTV revealed individuals wearing masks. Police officers, including riot police and a mobile camera van, were present in the back of the crowd.

The whole event passed without any major disturbances.

7. European Counter Jihad Meeting, Aarhus

**Background and context**

The Counter Jihad Meeting (CJM) meeting was an international rally of Defence Leagues and Counter Jihad groups from different European countries. The main organiser was the Danish Defence League (DDL), an organisation with an anti-Muslim political profile. The DDL is inspired by the English Defence League (EDL); they regard themselves as an EDL subsection. Topics of the meeting were to include Sharia Law, Halal food, immigration and their idea of the on-going ‘Islamification of Europe’. They chose Aarhus as the location because it is historically a centre of the political left, thus providing a focus for the right. Equally, there has been a trend among these right-wing groups to demonstrate and meet outside big cities. Permission was given for the DDL to hold a
rally in Mølleparken from 14.00 to 17.00 hours.

The event triggered a counterprotest from the local Anti-racist Network, Aarhus for Diversity (AfD), and was supported by a number of Copenhagen unions and anti-racist organisations. Participation was also expected from anti-racist organisations of neighbouring countries. Permission was given to Aarhus for Diversity to carry out a demonstration from 13.00 to 16.30 hours, starting with a rally at city hall, followed by a march through the city.

Because the European Counter Jihad movement is highly anti-Muslim, and the purpose of the meeting in Aarhus was to launch the start of a European anti-Muslim campaign, reactions from the Muslim community in Aarhus could be anticipated.

Risks according to the police
The overall risk was that the participants of the European Counter Jihad meeting would clash violently with participants of the counterdemonstration and with the police.

Police operation
The rally and the demonstration were handled by the police of East Jutland. The strategic intent was to ensure through effective and targeted action that the demonstrations could be carried out without conflicts, including consequent actions against those encouraging or committing crimes against the opposite party.

The tactics involved a consistent and measured offensive effort with a dialogue-based response, including the availability of tactical support to uphold security for participants. It was imperative that all police actions, including those of mobile tactical units (MIK), shared a common understanding of the dialogue-based execution and that—as long as the dialogue unit was functioning—tactical units were kept out of sight. The dialogue police officers were to be deployed close to the demonstrators; if possible, they would contact the participants on arrival at the demonstrations and follow the demonstration closely when walking the predetermined route. The commander would be in close contact with the mobile units and command centre.

The police would depart from the dialogue-based principle when confronted with tasks that demanded a different type of action. Mobile units were deployed to deal with violent confrontations and to ensure offenders would be brought to justice before the police returned to the dialogue-based response.

Prior to the event, police used existing cooperation channels to inform the Islamic society about the event and about freedom of speech in order to minimize interference with the demonstrations. During the event, police would continue with this dialogue with the establishment of a local command centre to include the participation of external partners who normally worked with the police in the area.

Observations from plainclothes officers were to contribute to the overview of the event. Foreign police officers were deployed in order to obtain as much intelligence as possible on the day of the event.

Course of events
Two events took place around this event: The ‘Counter Jihad Meeting’ (CJM) was set up as a rally in the park, ‘Mølleparken’. Counterprotest to this was the ‘Aarhus for Diversity’ rally and a marching demonstration. As this event ended before the CJM rally was finished, groups that had attended AfD, especially young people, repeatedly attempted to provoke CJM and to enter the park.

From 12.00 hours participants of the AfD demonstration assembled at Rådhusplatsen. A music truck with loudspeakers was present; banners and flags were handed out. Groups gathered, and a black block formed. Dialogue officers were deployed in groups of three or four. MIK units passed by the scene repeatedly. Loud, aggressive music played from the truck. By 13.10 hours the number of demonstrators had risen to 1,500–2000. Some dialogue officers commu-
nicated with demonstrators. MIK units were parked in streets close by but out of sight.

The demonstration started at 13.45 hours. Dialogue officers and stewards walked beside the march on one side of the street. The black block and the music truck were situated near the end of the march, followed by four MIK vans. About 100 local youngsters approached the march and walked quickly beside the demonstrators, displaying an aggressive body-language appearance. At one occasion, dialogue police talked to the people on the music truck in order to stop the music for a nearby funeral service. The music was switched off immediately for about three minutes. The march was conducted in a friendly way and reached its final destination around 15.00 hours. A rally took place with music and speeches. The audience was calm and quiet. The group of local youngsters were policed by an MIK unit. At 15.45 hours this group headed for Mølleparken, followed by the MIK unit.

The European Counter Jihad meeting took place at Mølleparken. Participants came from different European ‘defence leagues’ and affiliated organisations. Many of them arrived at the park by coaches. Event police officers talked to people in the park and mingled with the participants of the meeting. MIK vans were visibly deployed around the park.

Speeches began around 14.30 hours. During the rally, there were constant attempts from groups of counterprotesters to enter the area and disturb the event. MIK units monitored ‘Arab’ looking men, searched individuals and stopped counterprotesters from entering the park; a number of arrests were made. Other counterprotesters gathered on the other side of a river, some holding Palestine flags. One group chanted Allah Akbar (Allah is great), police was deployed around them.

Around 15.30 hours, during the speech by the EDL leader, approximately 35 counterdemonstrators approached, shouting anti-racist slogans and attempting to enter the park. The bodyguards behind the EDL speaker forced entry to the library in order to remove the leader to safety while others approached the counterdemonstrators. Eight members of the Counter Jihad meeting who had been positioned close to the speakers’ platform ran to fight with the counterdemonstrators but were stopped by plain clothes police officers. MIK officers acted rapidly and stopped counterdemonstrators from entering the park while urging approaching participants of the Counter Jihad meeting to remain in the park.

The event repeatedly saw attempts of groups of counterprotesters aiming to enter the park and attack the CJM rally. MIK units in full equipment intervened and made some arrests of counterdemonstrators. Participants of the CJM were urged back into the park. The events attracted a lot of media attention. At 16.50 hours Counter Jihad participants began leaving by buses protected by police. At 17.14 hours a group of young men with t-shirts with the text ‘Soldiers of Allah’ arrived. MIK vans were deployed to stop further confrontations and further arrests were made. Police figures show 89 arrests and seven police officers injured.

8. Rainbow Pride March, Bratislava

**Background and context**

The Rainbow Pride March in Bratislava is part of the Pride movement, dedicated to promote equal rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people. The event was held in Slovakia for the first time in 2010. The Rainbow Pride has a special political meaning within the Slovak society: According to the Slovak Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Rudolf Chmel (MOST-HID party), ‘Slovakia is among the worst EU countries (not only) in accepting non-heterosexual minorities, but generally in sensitivity towards any minorities’ (webnoviny, 2011). The first Rainbow Pride march in 2010 was disrupted by around 100
counterdemonstrators of Christian and nationalist backgrounds. On the other hand, the march received support from several public figures, nationally and internationally: Members of the European Parliament, for example, joined the march in person. Diplomats of Australia, the United States, Canada, representatives of the EC and ambassadors of 15 European countries declared their support for the Pride March in 2011, and they did again so prior to the march in 2012.

Rainbow Pride Bratislava 2012 was organised by the civic association Queer Leaders Forum. The organisers describe the goals of Rainbow Pride Bratislava as a march for the rights of non-heterosexual people, for their social and political equality, and a celebration of every democratic and open society.

The idea of Pride is based on three main principles:

- All people should be proud of their sexual orientation and gender identity
- Diversity is a gift
- Sexual orientation and gender identity are natural and they cannot be voluntarily changed (Dúhovýpride, 2012)

Prior to the march in 2012 the extremist nationalist party L’udová Strana Naše Slovensko, (LSNS) expressed opposition to the march on their Web site and on Facebook. Their statement contained no clear mobilisation or call for attacks; however, they suggested that ‘it is the duty of every nation of the prudent man, and especially Christians, to do everything to thwart the diabolical events’.

**Risks according to the police**
The police saw a risk if demonstrators did not stay within the route that had been agreed on. They argued that in that case, they would not be able to provide for the security of the participants.

**Police operation**
The Rainbow Pride was policed by the Slovakian National Police. They were supported by the Municipal Police of Bratislava who – together with the City Authority – had been engaged in pre-event talks and preparations with the organisers. The police considered the march to be the year’s most important event in Slovakia. The event was assessed as high risk, and the security and protection of the march was seen as the main objective. More specifically, the goals of the operation were security and safety for all attending persons, to keep opposing groups apart and to allow a non-hazardous run of the event. Police expected 2,000 persons to attend the Rainbow Pride, with a maximum of 200 counterprotesters. They monitored the Facebook activities of counterdemonstrators.
The event commander was the Head of the District of Bratislava, who commanded all 698 officers deployed. Among these were:
- 70 criminal police in plain clothes
- 300 officers permanently dressed in riot uniform and riot gear
- 82 officers from the intervention police unit
- 4 deputies (three of which come from traffic/patrol/criminal investigation office)
- the remainder made up of local police

They explained that the National Police did not have an operational centre to control and command such police operations. As a consequence, the commander would be out on the street.

Officers in riot gear were deployed around the assembly square. The square was fenced in with two entrances. Criminal investigation officers provided surveillance cameras to monitor the incoming people. The police explained that because of legal restrictions, they could not restrict counterdemonstrators from approaching the event. However, the legal situation allowed private security to check and search people when they entered a private place. The organisers made use of this: private security staff checked persons coming in the two entrances, checked and searched their bags and – if necessary – denied access. In addition, the organisers staffed these entrances with stewards.

A water cannon was held in reserve as tactical support. Maps were issued to each officer, all of whom carried a can of tear gas for personal protection, as is standard practise. Police officers would be deployed in groups of ten. The officers were instructed to be polite, to maintain the seriousness of their position, and especially not to joke about the participants. The officers received prepared instructions, and they were told which kind of persons to look for and how to react. With regard to their behaviour, officers of the Slovakian police and the municipal police have to comply with the ‘code of ethics’ of the Slovakian Police. In relation to their deployment at the Rainbow Pride, officers were clearly instructed not to show personal opinions and to remain neutral. It was therefore best for officers ‘not to communicate at all’.

Course of events
Participants of the Rainbow Pride gathered at Námestie Slobody Square. The Square was fenced in and secured by police and private security. About 40 counterdemonstrators had gathered on Námestie Slobody Street south, just in front of the south entrance. They carried flags and placards, some displaying biblical motifs and pictures of known Slovak fascists, a flag from the now-forbidden extremist party Pospolitost and the official national flag of the Slovak Republic. Some counterprotesters wore T-shirts with slogans, for example ‘For tradition and family – Against deviation’, ‘We don’t want homosexual extremists in Bratislava’. Others wore clothing from brands such as Lonsdale, Viking and Thor Steinar that are popular among right-wing extremist groups. There was no chanting. Participants who wanted to enter the square had to pass along this group. Even when larger groups arrived, there was no reaction from the counterdemonstrators – neither verbal nor physical.

The Rainbow Pride began with a rally on Námestie Slobody Square at 13.45 hours. Between 700 and 800 persons assembled, speeches were given and three
symbolic weddings took place. Just after the last wedding, at 14.05 hours, a smoke grenade went off in front of the stage. Immediately after this, security was requested at the stage, and the crowd was asked to stay calm. Some left, but the crowd shortly reassembled. Police intervened immediately and arrested a person within five minutes of the incident. The program went on with a short delay. From 14.13 hours police units were moved around the square, and one unit formed a line at the southern part to separate the counterprotesters on the street from the passing march. Parallel to that, instructions concerning the march were given from the stage. Participants were asked to stay together and to listen to stewards’ instructions. The march started at 14.30 hours. The counterdemonstrators saw the parade from behind the police cordon. There were no reactions from the counterdemonstrators. During the march, counterdemonstrators began leaving. The cordon remained but was gradually reduced.

A group of drummers walked at the front of the parade, followed by a crowd of about 700. Participants carried flags and banners, many with the rainbow symbol. They carried national flags (Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom, Poland) plus the EU flag and placards or T-shirts with slogans such as ‘Don’t be afraid of homophobia’, ‘Come out’, ‘God loves you’, ‘100% Christian – 100% gay’.

The march was surrounded by police officers. In front was a group of about ten officers in riot gear, fully equipped, from the intervention unit of the national police. Behind marched the security officer of the organisers, who was in contact with both the police commander of the municipal police and the head of the private security team. Some stewards walked behind them, whilst others mingled with the march. On the sides of the march, municipal police and national police in patrol uniform walked individually. There were variations in equipment; some carried only guns, others guns and batons. Some officers carried their batons in their hands.

The march went along the city and back to the rally point. Police of different forces and with different equipment and uniforms were deployed all along the route at crossings, in front of buildings, and near entrances of shops and restaurants. The crowd re-entered the square at around 15.10 hours. Police deployments were reduced at this time. At 15.30 hours a rain shower began; many participants left the square, while some stayed on awaiting a concert. Throughout the event police units remained around the square.

The police arrested two persons in relation to the smoke-bomb attack. No disturbances occurred during the march. With the exception of the smoke bomb, police and organisers reported no injuries or other incidents either during or after the event.

9. Global Counter Jihad Meeting, Stockholm

Background and context
The Global Counter Jihad meeting sought to bring together international organisations and individuals bound together by the idea of an on-going ‘Islamification’. Expected participants came from Defence Leagues (DLs), in particular the Swedish Defence League (SDL), English Defence League (EDL) and various ‘Stop Islamization’ organisations: Stop Islamization of Nations (SION), Stop Islamization of Europe (SIOE), and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA).

The Counter Jihad meeting was only one of a number of happenings taking place on 4 August 2012 in Stockholm. The main event on that day was the Stockholm Pride Parade, the concluding demonstration of the Stockholm Pride festival 2012. There was also a cruising festival of historic cars, along with a number of other events. All events were policed under a single operation called 4/8. For the Counter Jihad meeting, authorisation was given to use the Norra Bantorget square from 12.00 to 17.00 hours, with a public meeting from 14.00 to 16.00 hours.
The SDL officially organised the Global Counter Jihad meeting, which was then taken over by the head of the Danish organisation Stop Islamization of Denmark (SIAD), SIOE and the EDL. The SDL is strongly connected with the EDL. On their Web site (www.swedishdl.info) the SDL states: ‘This is the Official SDL Website. This site is fully supported by the English Defence League and is the only affiliated SDL’. On their Facebook page, the SDL described their task as ‘Together we can stop Islamization of our country!’ Further, they declare that the SDL stands ‘together with other Defence Leagues around the world for a peaceful resistance against the Islamization of our society. We chose an English name to show our support and gratitude to the EDL’.

The event affected different religious groups. The Islamic community was considered threatened, and there was probability that members would engage in counterprotests. On the other side, it was expected that members of the Syrian Christian community might support and attend the Counter Jihad meeting. The Dialogue Unit took measures to engage with both of these.

Counterprotests were announced and expected from different anti-racist and leftwing groups.

- Stoppa Nazismen Aktivt Ickevåld (SNAIV), which means ‘Stop Nazism active nonviolence’. In general SNAIV members hold up banners and leaflets that express their position or objection. They were the only group granted an official permit for a counterprotest.
- Stoppa EDL, an umbrella organisation of anti-racist and leftist groups and individuals. It may also attract members of the Swedish Anti-fascist Action Group and the Revolutionary Front. Their Internet site was also linked with the Danish Anti-fascist Network.
- Anti-racist Network Copenhagen mobilised on the Internet for a protest against the EDL event. They referred to the call made by Stoppa EDL and pointed to the announcement that had been made by the Royal Swedish Vuvuzela Orchestra (Autonom Infoservice 2012).
- The Royal Swedish Vuvuzela Orchestra is tied to anarchist and leftist circles; they issued a subtle mobilisation of disturbing the Counter Jihad meeting by vuvuzela noise.
- Queers against Pinkwashing (2012) stated on the Internet: ‘Not in our name – we refuse to be the fascists’ alibi!’ They accused the DLs of misusing the LGBT people, of washing their political colour from brown to pink and to ‘re-branding the Muslims’ as a threat to non-heterosexuals to be able to recruit within the LBGT community’.

Risks according to the police
Stockholm police expected a large (not specified) number of left-wing counterdemonstrators, including a busload of activists travelling from Denmark. The police saw a risk of public disturbance and attacks against the Counter Jihad meeting by small, focussed actions from such left-wing groups.

Police operation
The Swedish police approach to the policing of crowd events is called the Special Police Tactics – SPT. The SPT is an approach to public order policing that combines mobile tactics and dialogue and communication.

Five hundred to six hundred officers were working in the Stockholm area altogether; 450 officers of these were deployed within the 4/8 operation:
- 250 SPT officers from the Stockholm region
- 70 SPT officers from Scania (English for the region of Skane) and Gothenburg
- 12 dialogue unit officers from Stockholm, Scania and Gothenburg

10 See: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Swedish-Defence-League/105393699527450
2 football supporter police officers from Stockholm
100 regular officers not trained in SPT
Plainclothes officers
Mounted police
Dog units

Uniformed officers routinely carry a firearm, pepper spray and a baton. The policing style was set by the commander to be calm, confident, communicative and friendly.

In general, strategic decisions are made by the Gold commander, while Silver is responsible for operational decisions. Bronze commanders are in charge of implementing and controlling Silver’s decisions and may have specific areas of responsibility, such as, for example, the Pride Festival or the Counter Jihad Meeting. The head of the Stockholm Dialogue Unit, who was subordinated to the Silver commander, coordinated the dialogue teams. During the operation he was in constant contact with Silver in the mobile command post. No member of the dialogue unit was in the staff of the Gold commander. Information and decisions were passed to the dialogue officers by phone and SMS.

During the 4/8 operation 12 dialogue officers were deployed in six teams, including teams from Scania, Gothenburg and Denmark. It was the first time that Dialogue teams from different regions in Sweden worked together. The Dialogue teams were assigned to specific groups or persons:

- members of the DLs, in particular the organisers of the Counter Jihad meeting
- the chairman of the Muslim Community
- football supporters
- counterdemonstrators coming from Gothenburg – (dialogue officers from Gothenburg)
- counterprotesters from Scania – (dialogue officers from Scania)
- Danish counterdemonstrators – (event officers from Denmark)

All dialogue officers were armed except those from Gothenburg and Denmark. All officers could easily be identified by fluorescent vests with DIALOG POLIS written on it. The Danish officers wore plain clothes with the blue EU liaison officers’ vest.

Course of events
From 11.00 hours the square Norra Bantorget was sealed off with police tape and secured by police officers in pairs or small groups. At 13.00 hours police further established a perimeter by sealing off access to the square. From midday, counterprotesters gathered in the northeastern area of the square. They set up a truck with a loudspeaker system. Announcements were made, calling people to participate in the protest, and speeches were held. The crowd rose to 200–250 persons, gathering mainly around the truck. The police deployments were re-enforced with mounted police, SPT units, dialogue police and the dog unit. Anti-fascist chants came from the crowd and a banner STOPPA EDL was set up. At 13.38 hours a black block joined the crowd, vuvuzelas were played. The atmosphere intensified, and at around 14.08 hours fireworks were thrown from inside the

Police officers intervening during the Stockholm field study
The crowd; shortly after that an ammonium bomb was lit that caused people in the crowd to move. Officers contained a group, including the black block. Officers, vans and mounted police then pushed this group towards a park in a northern direction. One officer was hit by a firework and was secured by his colleagues. After the group was moved, dog units entered the park and dispersed black block participants, who had begun to reassemble. The black block later reassembled with other demonstrators, and the whole group advanced towards the police line at a junction. The mounted units at this junction prevented them from going any farther and then advanced towards the group, causing dispersal; some ran back into the park.

Around 14.30 hours police units entered the park from both the north and south corners and made at least two arrests. During this time the police contained the park, to prevent people from entering or leaving. At 14.55 hours the police moved the arrested persons out of the perimeter. Mounted officers secured the area and were immediately intimidated by the black block who also attempted to provoke a reaction. As officers approached to deal with the situation, the black block ran away, into the crowd.

The Counter Jihad meeting was held between 15.10 and 16.20 hours on the southern part of the square within a sealed-off area. A stage was set up facing the green area of Norra Bantorget square. Around 100 persons had gathered, of which around half may have been from different media.

On the northeastern corner the police line was re-enforced by parked police vans, thus separating the meeting from the counterprotesters. Some counterprotesters had assembled behind the vans and shouted disapproval, and at times were supported by vuvuzela players.

A smaller group of counterprotesters had assembled at the southern end of the park behind the police tape. Two counterprotesters had also accessed the crowd in front of the stage. When they started verbally to disturb the speeches, they were immediately guided out of the area by a plainclothes officer and a football supporter police officer. The counterprotesters behind the tape were not hindered. The group numbered up to 30 people. Speeches were held during the meeting, and there were repeated attempts to disturb the speeches by shouting and vuvuzelas.

The Global Counter Jihad Meeting ended at 16.20 hours. Police moved counterdemonstrators at the south towards the western end of the square by walking towards them, talking and gesturing. The people complied with this without any resistance. Shortly after this, the mounted units left the square. Around 16.30 hours the main speaker left the square in a car, escorted by the emergency response unit. Other participants of the Counter Jihad meeting were moved from the square in buses.

10. Cairde Na hÉireann parade, Liverpool

Background and context

The parade was organised by Cairde na hÉireann, CnE (Friends of Ireland), an ‘Irish community organisation campaigning for Irish Unity, defending and promoting Irish community rights and opposing fascism and racism’ (Cairdenaheireann, 2012). Their aim was to celebrate the International Brigades Commemoration, to remember all those from Merseyside and beyond who fought fascism in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, and to support the campaign for the peaceful reunification of Ireland. Previous marches in Liverpool have been held peacefully; however, far-right-wing extremist groups attacked two parades in February and July 2012.

Previously CnE used social media to publicize and announce the parades. But as a reaction to attacks on recent parades, there was an embargo of Facebook and Twitter, and no such information was posted. CnE instead used ‘secure’ communication channels. Because of this, counterdemonstrators had not officially mobilised or registered for a protest, but a
number of different organisations were expected to oppose the event:
- National Front, NF, an extreme right-wing party
- British National Party, BNP, a far-right-wing political party
- Combined Ex Forces, CXF, a network of former soldiers
- North West Inﬁ dels, a group of right-wing patriots, loyalists, and nationalists
- English Defence League, EDL, an anti-Islamic group

Whilst these groups were expected to oppose the CnE parade, they are far from a cohesive group. Right-wing extremist groups such as NF criticised the EDL for their pro-Israel attitude. The anti-EDL ‘EDL News’ (2012) noted a split by CXF and the Inﬁ dels from the EDL in 2011 ‘after weeks of bickering, back biting and threats of violence’. Hopenothate (2012), on the other hand, stated that ‘a relationship still continues with the EDL rank and ﬁ le and the CXF have organised demonstrations alongside the EDL and with the North West Inﬁ dels’ (Hopenothate, 2012).

According to the organisers, the code of conduct applied by CnE Liverpool prohibited participants from drinking and violence. They asked participants to leave at home small children and older people. Organisers told those attending the parade not to respond to provocations, to march with dignity and not to be concerned about the number of participants. Stewards deployed by CnE had previous experience from earlier marches in Liverpool, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Their tasks were clearly allocated: They would focus only on their own people, not on the counterdemonstrators. They made it clear that the police would deal with incidents by counterdemonstrators.

**Risks according to the police**

Relating the recent developments around CnE marches, there was a risk of disturbances by counterprotesters.

**Police operation**

The parade was to start at 13.00 hours from Great Orford Street on Mount Pleasant and arrive at 14.10 hours on Water Street, close to the River Mersey. Merseyside Police expected 200 to 300 persons, including 9 flute bands and 15 to 20 stewards. Approximately 100 counterprotesters were expected. The parade escort was planned to include two PSUs, six dog handlers and six officers on motorcycles, followed by 10 mounted officers. An inner foot escort, consisting of one PSU and stewards, planned to walk alongside the parade. Four PSUs would be deployed as an outer foot escort, two to each side.

Merseyside police apply a ‘liaison approach’ of engagement as a strategic tool in preparation and policing political events. Dialogue between organisers and police is regarded as an opportunity to build a relationship of trust. Five liaison ofﬁ cers were deployed to three different areas around the CnE parade: the parade itself and the counterdemonstration, and one ofﬁ cer would be with the main organiser. During deployment these ofﬁ cers wore blue vests with POLICE LIAISON on top of their yellow ﬂ uorescent jackets. A Bronze commander coordinated the teams.

Guidelines were set for the operation. The ﬁ rst stated that ‘Merseyside Police will facilitate peaceful protest’, based on the ‘Fair, Friendly, Flexible & Firm’ approach, the ‘Just Think’/‘Just Talk’ approach, and an attempt to establish rapport. Further, ofﬁ cers were asked to make use of appropriate

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11 PSU: Police Support Unit, consisting of one inspector, three sergeants and 21 constables.

12 ‘Just Think’ highlights the standards of Courtesy, Appearance, Professionalism, Off-duty conduct. Acknowledging that these are generally well engrained within the force, Merseyside police saw the need to ‘reemphasize the rules for a proper conduct’.

13 The ‘Just Talk’ approach of Merseyside police suggests to ‘make a big deal out of small talk’. It identiﬁ es the weight and importance of dialogue between individuals and thus re-emphasises the need for ofﬁ cers to communicate with the public.
language and terminology and to consider the force’s reputation in their actions. The second guideline stated that ‘Merseyside Police is impartial in its Policing of peaceful protests and is here for observance of the Law’. This would be established by
- Dialogue/protestor liaison
- Evidence gathering/CCTV
- Notable location monitoring
- Proportional deployment of staff
- Assembly, procession & speeches
- Dispersal plan
- Return to normality

The use of force should be minimal yet appropriate in the circumstances. Officers would need to be able to justify their actions and consider media interest in this operation. Officers were shown the officially recognised press card. However, it was also likely that officers would be recorded or filmed by phones, and officers were asked to be aware of this. Public order incidents that might trigger or increase disorder were to be dealt with quickly. Where offences were apparent, officers were expected to take positive action to prevent serious disruption or disorder to the community. Wherever possible, arrests were to be at the direction of the Silver and Bronze commanders. However, the decision to make arrests was at the discretion of individual officers.

Professional standards and appearance demanded dress code 2, which is, normal duty hats with protective helmets secured on a waist belt. Relating to Human Rights, officers were briefed to carry out their actions in a proportionate, legal, accountable, and necessary manner.

Course of events
The parade started at 13.15 hours from Mount Pleasant. Motorcycle officers were in front, followed by police vans and mounted officers in a wedge formation. Officers on foot escorted the parade; stewards were dotted along the parade, between participants and the public. Police vans followed at the rear. Most of the parade consisted of band members. The remaining group was a mixture of left-wing activists, families and some individuals with covered faces. People carrying flags from different leftwing organisations marched at the front. Stewards effectively marshalled the event. Two stewards were in direct contact with the Police Liaison Officers. In tense situations, the stewards also addressed other nearby officers. The parade was stopped by the police several times in order to keep it close together or when there were people in the way.

The march passed counterdemonstrators, who acted in different ways: There were individual people or groups standing still, shouting abusive slogans or holding up signs. Others walked with the march, stopped every now and then, and continued on their way; some were filming. A number of them also tried to get in front of the parade and later to get around police lines. On one occasion, some counterdemonstrators sat down in front of the police vans, ahead of the parade. The police immediately reacted to this situation by removing the demonstrators from the road. Most of the all behaviour from counterprotesters was limited to verbal aggression. Occasionally police had to intervene when people would not comply with orders or tried to break through a line. A dog unit was deployed when a group of 20–30 counterdemonstrators verbally abused and physically approached a police cordon and pushed against the officers. The police tightened their formation by reducing the space between them, and some officers pushed back agitated persons. The situation did not escalate any further.

The parade proceeded to its end, where coaches awaited participants. Police controlled this location, with officers forming cordons. Verbal aggression came from 20–30 counterprotesters standing at the pavement, holding banners stating ‘Hang IRA scum’. The mounted police moved in front of the group, separating them from the parade. Officers on foot moved
in to support the mounted officers, holding back the protesters. When the parade approached, the counterprotesters ran around a block of houses in order to reach the parade from a side street. They were further blocked by another cordon of police officers, which caused them to run around another block. They stopped in front of another line of officers and continued with verbal protests. This cordon then walked forward 30 meters, thus moving the protesters away. In front of this, a police evidence-gathering team filmed the scene. The counterprotesters kept on running until they reached the end of Water Street, where they met another cordon of officers. Three liaison officers were present along with a high number of other PSUs. The Police Liaison Officers talked to the protesters. The parade participants got on to their buses and were escorted out of the area at 14.50 hours.

Parade during the Liverpool field study
The following recommendations for dialogue and communication have been drawn from the ten field study observations carried out within the GODIAC project. The emphasis during the observations focused upon the four conflict-reducing principles, as identified by Reicher and colleagues (2004; 2007): knowledge, communication, facilitation and differentiation. The following recommendations incorporate these principles; however, good examples, were also found in organisational and management issues that support the application of these principles.

The first section contains recommendations that directly concern police interaction with organisers, groups and individuals. This part also contains the afore-mentioned ‘four principles’ and the work of a specified ‘dialogue unit’.

The second section relates to issues focused upon to internal police work such as management, training and command, areas that are not directly observable at a crowd event: strategy and tactics, command and control, and planning and organising.

### Knowledge and education

Along with criminal intelligence on known troublemakers, emphasis should be taken on understanding ‘when and why these individuals have an impact on the crowd as a whole and hence when a relatively small minority can cause a general conflagration’. In order to understand, judge, anticipate and adequately respond to group behaviour, it is of great importance to educate oneself about the respective ‘values, standards aims and goals, their sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups’.

(Reicher et al. 2004:566 sqq)

### Thorough information gathering, involvement of academic knowledge

In addition to standard intelligence gathering and assessment, it is recommended that information be gathered about the main groups that are expected to be present at the events, including academic knowledge associated with specific groups.

#### Using existing knowledge

It is important to use officers with knowledge and understanding of the specific groups involved. This may involve officers from different regions or countries, for example, the deployment of dialogue teams. This applies to both planning and policing the event.

#### Specific training for officers involved in policing demonstrations

A regular training program which includes commanders and supervisors should embrace public order, crowd dynamics and crowd psychology along with protest groups and their modi operandi, for example, how to respond to the different tactics of specific groups.

#### Knowledge of protestors’ aims and tactics

It is an advantage to have good knowledge and awareness of protestors’ aims and tactics. This can help to appraise and distinguish behaviour involving symbolic acts of resistance or civil disobedience from criminal offences and distinct acts of violence. In doing so, police can avoid misunderstandings and react appropriately to situations, for example, to provocations by the Rebel Clown Army or to flag burning.
Knowledge of significant/iconic locations and symbolic behaviour
The identification of significant and iconic locations and actions together with their importance to demonstrators can significantly influence policing tactics and prevent overreactions. For example, Castor demonstrators would occupy the tracks to delay the transport as a symbolic gesture but accept that ultimately they would be moved on.

Complex mindset concerning the event
It is important that officers have a broad knowledge and understanding of the context of the event and of participating groups as well as an understanding of crowd dynamics and crowd psychology (i.e., how the crowd would react in certain situations) to inform their own role within the event. An example would be not intervening in symbolic flag burning in Barcelona.

Basic and reinforced knowledge – using email for updating information
Educate and inform public order officers with general information regarding protestor groups as part of their initial training which should be specifically updated through verbal briefings together with other means of communication such as email updates and text messages.

Combination of concepts
The officers taking part in deployments should receive instructions and information on how different police concepts and tactics are planned to work together (i.e. they understand the policing plan and their own role within it).

Brochure with event information for officers
A well-written, short but comprehensive overview of all aspects surrounding the event can help provide different police units with the same level of knowledge. This is recommended particularly for operations that deploy officers from different regions and forces.

Communication
Communication refers not only to what is communicated but also how and to whom this is done. Persons should be culturally knowledgeable about the groups in the crowd and be trusted and respected by such groups. Before the event, communication may involve agreements with organisers about ‘how their legitimate aims will be met, what contingencies will be put in place if conflict should occur and how the organisers and police will work to realise crowd aims in such circumstances’. Whilst communication proceeds all through the event, it is particularly important at a stage of developing violence. Different technical means such as the media, Web sites or agreed-upon leaflets help convey the message to crowd members, as do visual and sound technologies as an event unfolds.

(Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004, 567ssq.)
Comprehensive communication strategy and use of social media

A comprehensive communication strategy should embrace traditional as well as new ways of communicating. This includes:

- Pre-event consultations with business and residential communities
- Traditional media
- Effective use of information leaflets
- SMS
- Social media, e.g., Twitter, Facebook
- Police Internet site

Some forces, for example, provided an Internet site with information about the event, containing, for example, a forum to discuss policing; sections on press information, conflict management, and legal aspects; an overview on events from participants/activists; and links to other organisations. The Internet site may be used as well during the event to provide accurate information.

Pre-event contact

Pre-event engagement with organisers is essential to build trust and confidence. This approach will help build relationships which become critical to challenges that arise during the event. Contacts should be made as early as possible and meetings held between identified police officers and protest groups. Discussions of mutual expectations and agreements are important for the outcome of the operation.

Police may not always be able to make contact as some groups refuse conversation; therefore, opportunities for discussions are not always possible. Nevertheless, police should persist to make efforts to get in touch with the groups and seek to negotiate ways of co-operation. This process can continue after the event.

During the field studies, the GODIAC team observed good attempts and examples to build and keep contact and trust between the involved groups (police, organisers, interest groups, for example, ethnic or religious): Preparatory meetings of different natures were held at early stages, sometimes starting more than half a year before the event. Talks involved political, operational and logistical issues. The intensive preparation provided the organisers with enough time to inform their people about the content of the talks, which can be interpreted as a sign of developing trust in the police. Having a series of meetings proved to be crucial as more issues and concerns for all involved were able to be solved before the event. Over the long term, such contact and engagement served to build trust and confidence for those involved.

Pre-event contact with public

Contact and engagement with residential communities and business communities counteracts rumours or alarmist media. The trustful cooperation set up during preparatory meetings provides more effective communication and better decision making during the event.

Communication with participants on different levels and functions

Good practise was observed when officers of all ranks communicated with demonstrators, including
the use of loudspeakers as a means to keeping the crowd informed of police intentions. The aim was to keep the perceptions of police legitimacy at the forefront and to avoid rumours or tensions building up because demonstrators did not know what was going on.

**Supportive officers**

It is recommended that officers remain alert and have an awareness for situations where assistance is needed. For example, individual officers in Lisbon helped some persons, like elderly people, who were inadvertently caught up in a demonstration occasion by assisting them in leaving potentially dangerous areas.

**Debrief discussions with organisers**

Post-event meetings with demonstration organisers together with a joint meeting with all organisers to debrief the event support the building of long-term relationships to proactively prevent violence, reduce confrontations and build trust and confidence for the future.

**Use of external mediators**

In circumstances where some groups are reluctant to engage with the police the use of independent mediators can help to re-establish and build relationships. In one example, Pastors have been used for conflict resolution. In contrast to members of police dialogue units, they are able to perform a genuine mediating function utilising their independence.
Dialogue Unit

Launching a dialogue unit
When introducing a dialogue approach, there is a danger—and this is a ‘normal’ effect in some police forces—that these teams become an excuse for other officers not to talk and engage anymore.

Deployment of dialogue/communication units
During an event, dialogue teams can be deployed for several purposes. For example, they can negotiate with demonstrators, inform participants of impending police actions, and find solutions that both parties can agree upon. The work of the teams may help to prevent confrontations and to de-escalate conflicts. The teams can also make interventions transparent for involved protesters and bystanders.

Professionalism—specialised units
Full-time officers of dialogue units are able to utilise their experience and knowledge and to handle negotiations in a very professional way. The fact that they are able to make their own decisions is positive. In addition, they work in close cooperation with the command structure.

Use of dialogue police officers with different ethnic backgrounds
Dialogue police officers from different backgrounds have a wider view of the groups present. For example, they may have knowledge about the participants’ cultural background, specific rules, and do’s and don’ts. It may be easier for them to make contact with specific groups.

Deployment of dialogue officers from the same regions/countries as protesters
Deploying officers from the same regions as protesters can facilitate the policing of these groups. When intelligence indicates the participation of protesters from different regions or countries it is recommended to request officers that have a working relationship with such groups because they are familiar with and have a deeper understanding and knowledge of these protest groups.

Police liaison officer during the Liverpool field study
Dialogue police officers from Sweden and Denmark during the Stockholm field study
‘Just Talk’ approach

Liverpool: The ‘Just Talk’ approach of Merseyside Police suggests that officers ‘make a big deal out of small talk’. It identifies the weight and importance of dialogue between individuals and thus reemphasises the need for officers to communicate with the public. This approach, designed for the whole organisation, is important in everyday as well as public order events, where information is equally essential and can help to establish trust between police and citizens.

‘Just Think’ approach

Building on the ‘Just Talk’ approach, it draws upon four simple standards:

- Courtesy – Treat everybody with courtesy and respect at all times. There is no excuse for incivility.
- Appearance – Be proud to wear your uniform and make sure your appearance reflects that pride. When not in uniform, ‘look the part’.
- Professionalism – Professionally competent, courageous, firm but fair with honesty and integrity at all times. A little bit of common sense goes a long way!
- Off-duty conduct – You are always a member of Merseyside Police on or off-duty.

Acknowledging that these standards generally are well engrained within the force, Merseyside Police saw the need to ‘reemphasize the rules for a proper conduct’. More particularly, the behaviour while on-duty would involve: ‘no hands in pockets, no mobiles, no chewing gum, no smoking’. And the police should keep in mind the ‘four Fs: fair, firm, friendly, and flexible’.

Facilitation

‘An emphasis on facilitation needs to be paramount at all stages of the police operation’. This includes

- identify the group’s legitimate goals
- ‘consider how best to organise policing so as to enable them to be met (...)’
- be positive and creative in finding alternative ways of meeting (and being seen to meet) the underlying aims’

Facilitation becomes most important where violence is beginning to break out and/or when police need to impose limits on the crowd. A ‘clear indication that the police are supporting collective aims (and that violence endangers them) can make the difference between escalation and de-escalation’.

(Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004: 567).

Facilitation of authorised demonstration

Authorised demonstrations will normally include agreements around the event. Police would therefore work with the organisers, particularly with respect to stewards, traffic plans, maintaining public order and preventing crime. Facilitation during the event may involve giving and pointing out directions, traffic control, supporting the stewards along the marching route as well as explaining and giving

Mounted police officers talk to public prior to parade at the Liverpool field study
Planning should involve efforts to minimise the impact on third parties, for example, on public transport and daily businesses.

Facilitation of challenging events
Some organisers of an event are not particularly cooperative. Through continuous and great efforts the police might still succeed in facilitating contact and dialogue with the organisers, for example, by appointing a specific officer as a contact person. High flexibility around meetings can help secure agreements with the event organisers, including the meeting points and site of the main event.

Facilitation of access and departure
Where appropriate, police may assist with the access and departure of protesters. This could include escorting protesters from the location after the event.

Facilitation of spontaneous, unofficial groups and public
Unauthorised marches may be facilitated, but it must be a command decision. Such decisions can be influenced by the level of communication and cooperation between the police and the group. Facilitation may involve a large number of police officers to provide an element of control with a difficult group.

Lawful and peaceful protest may be facilitated by active engagement of dialogue officers, by escorting protesters, or by sealing off an area for counterprotests close to the main event. However, too close a proximity of the counterprotesters to arriving participants may also present a potential for risk.

Example: In Stockholm, only one of the counter-demonstrations was officially approved. Nonetheless, even though most of the groups present had no permit, they were well facilitated by the police. The police, for example, sealed off an area where counterprotesters were able to deploy a loudspeaker van. Police allowed other counterprotestor groups to get close to the main event, where only a police tape and a small number of officers separated them.

Differentiation
Policing crowds involves the challenge of treating all crowd members the same. Differentiation refers to the acknowledgement of variety in a crowd (different identities, ways of acting and of reacting). Specifically in conflict situations, when action must be taken against part of the crowd, ‘it becomes important to treat the generality of crowd members in a friendly way’. Exceeding the level of perceptions ‘must be built into every tactical or strategic decision, into training, planning, equipping, briefing and operating in crowds’.

(Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004: 568ssq.).

Addressing suspected individuals
Suspicious persons should be addressed individually in such a way that no other bystanders are affected. Clearly differentiated, dynamic and quick handling of individuals acting suspiciously may prevent any risk from spreading onto the surrounding area.

Such handling was observed, for example, in Liverpool: When people started to get agitated, officers first went up to speak with them. The intervention was escalated when a person did not comply with the officers’ instructions, resulting in officers escalating their appropriate use of force to achieve their legitimate aim.

Escalated deployment with escalating behaviour/clear signals
Differentiation may also involve clear signals to participants of what behaviour will be tolerated. In one observation, mounted and foot officers were deployed to separate a group of counterprotesters who had
engaged in verbal aggression and used banners with abusive language. The intervention gave a clear signal to the counterprotesters that such behaviour was not to be tolerated. At the same time, dialogue officers were deployed to interact with those counterprotesters behaving appropriately to reassure them and to explain the police action.

**Short-time containment**
Short-time containment or separation of hostile or violent parts of the crowd can give a clear message to those behaving inappropriately whilst allowing the main event to proceed without disturbances.

**Advanced police action in a crowd**
Advanced police action in a crowd bears the danger of affecting uninvolved persons. In one demonstration, advanced police action in the immediate area of black block members within the demonstration was carried out in a way that allowed participants outside this area to leave the scene without any obstacles built up by the police action.

**Targeted arrests**
Good examples of arrests were observed where police officers worked quickly, discreetly and concentrated on arresting for their identified suspects. Other demonstrators and bystanders were not threatened and/or personally influenced by the police action, and the event was hardly disturbed.

**Flexibility**
Differentiation also refers to police contingency and competence to adjust deployment and measures to changing risk. This requires high flexibility of escalation and de-escalation. Policing low risk and/or peaceful participants will involve friendly, courteous, communicative and easily approachable officers, with back-up teams not visible.

During police interventions in tense situations, officers should act calmly and with concentration; dialogue officers may help to calm down the situation. Supporting officers should subsequently be withdrawn once the risk decreases.
Strategy and tactics

**Integrated command and control**
Co-location of decision makers enables quick-time and inclusive command and control of the event and is key should the circumstances deteriorate.

*Vienna:* The integration and co-location of key partners in a crisis system of the fire department, rescue services and traffic services shortened lines of communication thereby facilitating rapid decision making.

*Budapest:* Good organisation; the National Police and the Budapest Police were sharing a communication centre

*Aarhus:* The command centre was close to the location of key partners, making it easy for them to cooperate.

**Transparency and honesty**
Openness of a police service and transparency regarding police operations demonstrates a healthy and positive approach to facilitate learning.

Examples particularly noted in London:
- engaging and allowing legal observers to watch and critique the police work
- embedding the media in the police operation
- substantial amounts of self-reflection amongst the entire police service.

**Command and control**

**Making use of camera system as part of event monitoring**
Police should make use of existing CCTV systems (traffic, local authorities or other sources) and embed this, where appropriate, into their command and control structure.

**Internal information flow and briefing**
The command strategy and policing intention must be communicated throughout the entire command structure and be briefed to all officers on the event.

Good internal communication and information flow involves frequent communication between gold commander and silver commanders and, likewise, on-going briefings between section commanders during the event. A professional and calm atmosphere in the command room also helps to ease processes. Constant contact between the head of the dialogue police and the silver commander can help to get actual information in terms of the dialogue approach and to utilise that to inform the appropriate tactical response.

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**Pro-active measures**
Cooperation with third parties regarding pro-active measures can help avoid unnecessary damage. For example, by making sure that the streets are cleaned and potential missiles are removed. This may also include prompt street cleaning/repairs post-event.
Planning and organising

**Scenario planning**
The use of scenario and contingency planning is beneficial and may be used as part of the planning process and subsequently for the briefing of bronze or section commanders.

**Debriefing and learning**
Debriefing meetings within the operational organisation should also be used to derive learning points for future events. Observations should inform training modules, thus establishing an on-going cycle of continuous improvement.

**Identification of officers**
Clear identification displayed by officers is positive. This may even include details displayed on protective helmets. Identification can be especially important where officers are deployed from different regions:

In Bratislava, for example, coloured stripes that officers had attached to their uniforms indicated different police units. This assisted the commander and the officers in identifying and distinguishing the different units. It provided a significant aid in command and control. It also appeared to work well in dealing with a local situation, where police officers from different regions formed a single riot control unit. These markings could therefore help officers to re-join their units, especially in complicated situations.

**Logistics – catering**
Catering provided for the police officers should be of good quality. Maintaining standards in a protracted and stressful operation is a way to acknowledge the officers’ contributions and assist in maintaining morale.

**Good stewarding**
A system of well-trained committed stewards of all age groups employed by organisers and effectively tasked can complement and reinforce the positive atmosphere of an event.

This was observed both in London and in Liverpool, where stewarding was carried out in a skilled way. The stewards on the parade provided a contact point between police and participants; they assisted the policing and facilitated a self-policing approach. The relationship between police and stewards appeared relaxed and trustful.


Queers against pinkwashing (2012). Not in our name – we refuse to be the fascists’ alibi! Retrieved from https://queersagainstpinkwashing.wordpress.com/in-english/


Silver Commander – Tactical Development Form for Operation Hailwood. Internal document provided by the Metropolain Police Service.


Appendix

Project management and partner organisations

Project management:
• Police Superintendent Christian Wessman, project manager, Swedish National Police Board
• Police Superintendent Stephan Kiernan, project coordinator, Swedish National Police Board
• Doctor Heléne Lööw, researcher, Uppsala University Sweden
• Doctor Martina Schreiber, researcher, Police Academy of the Netherlands

Partner organisations:
• Austrian Ministry of Interior, Austria
• Police Headquarters of Cyprus, Cyprus
• Central Police Department of Lower Saxony, Germany
• Hungarian National Police, Hungary
• Hungarian Parliamentary Commission for Civil Rights, Hungary
• Merseyside Police Headquarters, United Kingdom
• Metropolitan Police, United Kingdom
• Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romania
• General Inspectorate of the Romanian Gendarmerie, Romania
• County Police Authority of Stockholm, Sweden
• County Police Authority of Skåne, Sweden
• County Police Authority of Västra Götaland, Sweden
• German Police University, Germany
• Centre for Police Studies, Denmark
• Institute de Seguritat Public de Catalunya, Spain
• National Policing Improvement Agency, United Kingdom
• Police Academy of the Netherlands, The Netherlands
• Higher Institute of Police Science and Internal Security, Portugal
• Uppsala University, Sweden
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