



Policing Football Matches with an International Dimension in the European Union: understanding and managing risk.

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Background

Across the European Union there are widespread differences in 'styles' of public order policing. These differences emerge for a variety of reasons but can essentially be understood to range from coercive to consensual in their orientation. Coercive styles are loosely characterised by the management of 'public order' through the high visibility and early use of paramilitary 'intervention squads'. In contrast consensual styles are characterised by the management of 'public order' through negotiation, non-violent intervention and communication prior to the deployment of 'riot squads'. Despite these widespread differences there is little systematic research on the viability of these two approaches and therefore adoption of the competing styles is usually a matter of police experience.

Probably one of the largest ever systematic studies of 'public order' policing was conducted during Euro2000. The study, which was part of a wider EC funded research project on international police co-operation, was oriented toward understanding the impact of public order philosophy and tactics on observed levels of 'disorder'. Using observation teams in each of the host cities for each of the matches played data was gathered on the nature and levels of police deployment and the nature of fan behaviour. Perhaps one of the most striking findings was the relationship detected between perceived 'risk', style of public order policing and levels of 'disorder'.

Data analysis was able to detect two contrasting styles of public order policing at work during the tournament. These two contrasting styles essentially mirrored those between the consensual and paramilitary styles outlined above, being characterised here as 'low profile' and 'high profile' respectively. 'High profile' deployments were defined in terms of approximately three times the level of visibly deployed police officers, greater visibility of 'riot' police and 'riot' vehicles and despite the larger number officers on the ground a lower overall level and quality of contact between police and fans. Using the levels of 'risk' defined by the security forces during the tournament the study was able to analyse the relationship between these contrasting styles and observed levels of 'public disorder' in 'low' and 'increased' risk situations.

Rather surprisingly it was found that the greatest levels of 'disorder' actually occurred in 'low risk' situations when 'high profile' policing had been utilised. Indeed in 'low risk' situations with 'high profile' deployments there was approximately twice the level of observed 'disorder' in contrast to 'low profile' deployments with the same level of risk. Moreover, in 'high risk' situations there were no significant differences in the levels of observed 'disorder' despite the fact that there were nearly three times as many officers deployed visibly on the ground. Put in other words the study demonstrates that in 'low risk' situations 'high profile' deployments actually coincide with the highest levels of observed 'disorder'. Moreover, in 'increased risk' situations 'high profile' deployments do not have a significant impact on the observed levels of 'disorder' (see figure 1).




Figure 1: Observed levels of public disorder in high and low risk situations where low and high profile deployments have been utilised.

Current study.

While the Euro2000 based research made significant strides forward the study was not able to address the social and psychological processes that underpinned this observed relationship between policing and levels of observed 'disorder'. Additionally the study also pointed toward the limited understanding of 'risk' and subsequent difficulties in predicting which events will become disorderly and why. In order to address these limitations a subsequent study has been developed utilising the Euro2000 expertise supplemented with theoretical and methodological expertise developed from crowd psychology. The project has been joint funded by the U.K. and Dutch Interior Ministries and currently enjoys partnerships between the University of Liverpool, The Dutch Police Academy, Universities of St Andrews and Abertay Dundee, the U.K. National Police Training College and the Portuguese Interior Ministry. The study has taken data from over 35 matches in 11 European Nations involving English (and one Scottish) club teams competing in the Champions League and UEFA cup and the English national team. Data has been obtained using ethnographic framework utilising semi structured observation and interviews with all involved parties (police - host and visiting, clubs, fans, football associations, consulates). This data has been supplemented by the use of internet based surveys based on a website <http://www.footballfans.org.uk>.

Of the matches observed in the current study the vast majority involved no major incidents of 'public disorder' despite the fact that the majority of them were defined as 'high risk'. Once again the current research highlights the limited way in which we currently conceptualise and define 'risk' to 'public order'. However, during these events situations of 'risk' did emerge before, during and after matches. Moreover, during some events widespread conflict did occur. Thus the current research was oriented toward understanding the factors that govern these shifts toward and away from 'risk' / conflict. Moreover, it has been concerned with developing proposals for how such factors can most effectively be managed by the security forces planning major tournaments such that 'risk' or the 'conditions of conflict' can be kept to a minimum.

The dynamic nature of risk and its classification.

One of the primary findings of the research is that 'risk' is dynamic and the outcome of interaction. As such the normal means of characterising 'risk' are too rigid since 'risk' can emerge and decline during an event. Consequently 'risk' should be seen as occurring on a continuum ranging from low to high. Movement up and down this continuum can occur within all events and is primarily governed by interaction between fans and various institutions. These institutions are normally but not exclusively the police. For example, the most commonly observed emergent 'risk' occurred at entry point to stadiums and was governed primarily by the flow rate through turnstiles (or gates). Such situations reflect the outcome of an interaction between fans and the institution of the club or stadium and have little to do with interaction with the police. However, in other situations the police have governed interaction at entry points and have therefore played a contributory role to the emergence of risk.

'Risk' is traditionally understood as a characteristic of groups or of individuals within groups and is usually defined in terms of two factors. The first is the history of the fan group. If a fan group has previously been involved in incidents of 'disorder' (particularly with the host police force) then there is a tendency to define the fan group as 'high risk' regardless of the actual levels of risk posed. For example, in 2002 Oporto based F.C. Boavista played Manchester United in the Second round of the Champions League. The result had little significance in the outcome of the group as United had qualified. Moreover, the evidence based on fan behaviour during their visit to the city suggested that they posed very low risk to 'public order' and this was recognised by the host police force. None the less the match was defined throughout as 'high risk' primarily because during the last visit of Manchester United to Oporto there had been a 'riot' involving widespread conflict between United fans and the police. Our findings suggest that while prior history of the fan group is, of course, an important predictor of risk it can produce errors in defining risk. Moreover, basing risk assessment on prior history can also lead to negative fan stereotyping and the utilisation of tactics which actually contribute to the overall levels of risk (see below).

The second is the categorisation of individuals within the wider fan base. This means of categorisation utilises three different categories (A, B & C) and has come to be almost universally adopted across Europe. The vast majority of fans are understood as category A whereby they pose no abnormal 'risk' to 'public order'. Category 'B' fans are seen to pose a 'risk' since they are understood to be individuals who welcome opportunities to engage in 'disorder' when such opportunity is present. But it is category 'C' fans who are seen to pose the highest 'risk' since they are understood to organise and actively seek out 'disorder'. Consequently, all U.K. based and some other European operations specifically deploy operational units to locate category B & C fans in order to allow the deployment of 'riot' squads in the vicinity of the 'prominents'. While once again such categorisation and subsequent location and targeting can be very useful it also leads to problems. First, categorisation can be applied differently by different forces such that it creates confusion over how to deploy operationally toward fans.

Secondly, categorisation of fans can be dynamic within an event with numbers of category B & C fans varying dramatically. Finally, categorisation of fans tends to lead policing operations to ignore the actual behaviour of fans and the 'risk' such behaviour pose in that circumstance at that time. For example, during a match between BVB Dortmund and Arsenal in the first round of the Champions League the same loud and drunken boisterousness displayed by fans in bars was defined as a 'risk' when category B fans were present but was seen as acceptable in another bar when they were not.

Additional factors of 'risk'.

Accepting the problematic nature of the two primary 'risk' assessment factors identified above our research has identified three further factors that should be taken into account when classifying 'risk'. The first is defined as 'culture' where operational resources should be applied prior to an event in defining and understanding the culture and norms or 'social identity' of visiting fans. This operational 'intelligence' should be oriented toward understanding the perspective and sensitivities of visiting fans and should address the issue of what these fans are likely to want to do during their time in the host city. For example, for the vast majority of English and Scottish fans heavy drinking combined with loud and boisterous drunkenness in the run up to the match is the norm. Additionally, a large number of fans combine the football match with visits to local tourist attractions (whilst sober). The drinking culture among these fans does not necessarily lead them to become aggressive but they do tend to drink late into the day and therefore arrive late at grounds placing pressure on entry points. Moreover, this late arrival is sometimes exploited to facilitate entry to the ground by ticketless fans.

By defining before hand the cultural norms of the fan group it can be determined that closing bars and denying access to local tourist sites is likely to be seen as illegitimate by the majority of fans and therefore likely to contribute to increasing 'risk'. Consequently, measures can be developed to provide 'safe' drinking sites in areas that promote quick and easy intervention should it be necessary. Moreover, by being able to predict a high likelihood of late arrival at stadiums measures can also be taken to reduce 'risk' by promoting early arrival through communication and by using cordons to ease pressure on entry points. Thus by determining before hand cultural norms police operations can be oriented toward facilitating the legitimate intentions of the fans (social drinking, watching the match, visiting tourist sites) whilst controlling and undermining anyone seeking to exploit the situation for illegitimate ends ('disorder', gaining entry without a valid ticket).

The second factor is 'balance' or the 'perceived appropriateness' of the police deployments. Police operations are often acutely aware of the potential levels of 'risk' posed by events and the need to justify particular forms of police deployment. However, these assessments of 'risk' and the subsequent justifications for deployment do not necessarily take into account the extent to which fans are aware of the levels of 'risk' posed or indeed see police deployments as justified. For example, at a Champions League match between OSC Lille and Manchester United the United fans saw their fan group as posing little to no 'risk', and this was reflected in the assessment of the local football intelligence officer. Yet the match was defined as 'high risk' by the local commander and approximately one thousand police officers were on duty, the vast majority of whom were deployed in large groups in full 'riot' gear in sight of the United fans. This form of deployment led to situations in which the levels and styles of policing were seen as inappropriate (even dangerous) by United fans and subsequently shifts toward conflict were observed. Indeed it is this 'balance' between police deployments and fans perceptions of the 'appropriateness' of policing that lies at the heart of effective 'public order' policing in the context of football (see below).

The third 'risk' factor identified by our research is referred to as 'international police cooperation'. Perhaps one of the most significant features of organising the security at major football tournaments is that local commanders are forced to police events involving foreign nationals. This fact can introduce 'risk' and such 'risk' can be reduced through the effective operational deployment of police officers from the visiting police force. For example, during the match between F.C. Boavista and Manchester United mentioned above fans on the terracing area unfurled a large flag with the words "Tony O'Neil's Red Army". This was taken as a sign by the match commander that a signal had been given for Manchester United 'hooligans' to 'riot' subsequent to the match. This assessment went against all of the evidence of the low 'risk' posed by the United fans gathered by the research team and was contrary to the judgement of the operational commander and the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Football Intelligence Officers (FIO's) who were attending the match. The operational commander consulted with the FIO's and was able to validate the match commander's judgement and reassess the level of 'risk'. In so doing the operational commander was able to prevent an unnecessary escalation in police deployment. Thus, through effective international police cooperation a more valid and evidence based assessment of 'risk' was made possible and 'inappropriate' police deployment avoided.

Achieving Balance in Low and Increasing Risk Scenarios.

As stated above one of the central factors underpinning shifts toward 'risk' identified through our research is the perceived appropriateness by fan groups of police deployments during events. Indeed fans are acutely aware of the levels of risk they pose to 'public order' and often these fan based assessments accurately reflect the 'actual' levels of 'risk' and the overall levels of observed 'disorder'. Correspondingly there is an almost direct association between the emergence of 'risk', the conditions of widespread conflict and fans' perception concerning the 'appropriateness' of public order policing. This finding reflects the earlier Euro2000 based research that demonstrates that the highest levels of disorder occurred in situations where there was an imbalance between the levels of perceived 'risk' and the profile of policing. Our research suggests that conflict in such situations is mediated by fans perceptions regarding the 'appropriateness' of police action. Such findings are perhaps not surprising when one considers that one of the most stable findings in social psychological research is that conflict becomes more likely when the relationships between one group and another is seen as 'illegitimate'. Moreover, such findings reflect the conclusions of a wider body of research on the underlying causes of 'riots' during crowd events.

Consequently, the most effective way of policing public order is to maintain a 'balance' between the perceived levels of risk and the nature of policing deployment. Our research suggests that if balance is achieved there are specific psychological and behavioural consequences among the fans. First at a psychological level, police deployment is understood as appropriate and subsequently relations between the fan group and the police in general are seen as legitimate. Secondly, at a behavioural level, there is an emergent 'self policing' culture among fans whereby there is a marginalisation and isolation of 'hooligan' elements, a lack of support for (and even active suppression of) 'anti-social' activity among the fans and a generalised avoidance of conflict. This is particularly true among club sides but has also been evident among England fans. However, if balance is not achieved then there are also corresponding psychological and behavioural consequences. At a psychological level there is a perception of the inappropriateness of police action and intergroup relations between fans and police are seen as illegitimate. Subsequently, at a behavioural level, there is increased support for 'anti-social' activity and the emergence of uniform and generalised aggression / conflict.

In a 'low risk' scenario balance can be achieved in relatively straightforward way by 'low profile' police deployments. In increasing risk scenarios, however, things become slightly more complex. Inevitably as 'risk' increases there is increasing pressure to deploy 'riot' or 'intervention' squads. In other words as 'risk' increases so too does the tendency to deploy 'high profile' tactics. This in and of itself is not a problem because, if 'risk' assessment is evidence based, it is likely that as 'risk' increases fans will see the corresponding change in police deployment as appropriate (although it is also useful to communicate with fans at this stage and 'high profile' deployments are not always the best response to increasing 'risk' – see below). None the less once 'high profile' units are visible our research suggests that they must be deployed in a way that targets the specific factors of 'risk'. Failure to appropriately target the 'risk' factor can lead to perceived 'inappropriateness' among fans and so increase rather than reduce the levels of 'risk' posed by the situation. Consequently, the general rule is that the profile of police deployment must be matched as closely as possible to the actual levels and source of 'risk' posed by the direct and visible circumstance in which deployment takes place.

Dynamic evidence based police deployment.

So far the research has identified that 'risk' is a dynamic feature of all events that can ebb and flow as a consequence of specific patterns of interaction. Moreover, it has identified that 'risk' can emerge as a consequence of the relationship between the style of policing and the actual levels of 'risk' as it materialises within a specific situation. Consequently, it is essential that police deployment is both evidence based and dynamic. In other words the best means to establish accurate assessment of 'risk' is to ensure that evidence about the levels of risk actually being posed by fans on the ground is constantly obtained throughout the event. Moreover, the policing operation must be sufficiently flexible to respond to such evidence such that the nature of police deployments match and appropriately target the levels of 'risk' which are present.

Consequently, our research suggests that effective 'risk' management is achieved by policing operations that include deployments of officers in standard uniform (or plain clothes) that are required to gathering information on the presence of factors governing risk as they are materialising during the event itself. This information must be capable of influencing operational deployment. Moreover, should 'risk' factors be identified and the deployment of 'riot squads' be necessary there must be clear channels of communication between the 'riot' squad and officers responsible for gathering evidence of the factors governing 'risk'. Such communication will ensure that there is an adequate understanding among 'riot squad' officers of the goals of their deployment ensuring that risk factors are

appropriately targeted. Given that deployment will be designed to remove the 'risk' factors from the circumstance there must also be a clear strategy of graded de-escalation (i.e. removal of 'riot squads' at the earliest opportunity) to prevent any subsequent imbalance in the relationship between 'risk' and deployment.

Our research has also identified certain principles that should be adopted when officers are gathering evidence about the levels of 'risk' posed by the circumstance. It is important that information about risk should be gathered from the ground throughout the event rather than simply determined prior to the operation or assessed at a 'debrief'. Operational deployment should also be conducted in such a way as to ensure information is gathered from as many areas as possible in which fans gather. Moreover, there is a benefit in those officers who are gathering information from the ground to be identified as policemen, to be deployed in pairs (or small groups of no more than five) and to engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with fans. There are good operational reasons for this. The first is that by interacting positively with fans police officers are able to demonstrate and actively construct a positive relationship between the police force and fans. Such positive relations enhance the motivation of ordinary fans to provide information about emergent 'risk' (i.e. anti-social action by specific fans etc.). Secondly, by interacting in a friendly way with fans those officers who speak the fans language are able to gather information about any potential or emergent 'risk'. This information can then be fed into the command structure and is able to then influence 'appropriate' deployments. Finally, those officers who are familiar with their roles are often more capable of interacting with and gaining information from fans (not least of all because bonds of trust develop). So there is a value in using the same officers in similar roles across a number of different occasions.

There are a number of examples that help to make these principles slightly more concrete. The first demonstrates the importance of gathering evidence in a manner that allows the early assessment and targeting of risk. Observations were undertaken at a Champions League match between Ajax and Arsenal in Amsterdam. Throughout the event a senior officer (Superintendent) in fluorescent uniform was deployed with a personal aide (who also acted as a driver) in and around the city centre. The senior officer was responsible for gathering and collating information about the behaviour of both Arsenal and Ajax fans and determining levels of 'risk'. Throughout his deployment he engaged in a great deal of positive interpersonal interaction with both Ajax and Arsenal fans. During one conversation he was able to determine the presence of a large group of ticketless Arsenal fans in a bar selling tickets. He determined that this situation was one of potential 'risk'. Due to his established role and seniority the officer was capable of deploying a team of English and Dutch FIO's to the bar. This team of FIO's were firstly able to validate his assessment of 'risk' and if necessary deploy other officers in such a way as to monitor and subsequently reduce the emerging factor of 'risk'. Since the officer was well known to Ajax fans many of them spontaneously offered him information about 'risk' factors (in one case Ajax fans informed him that another Ajax fan was seen with a gun). A second example is provided by the Oporto police who have been observed using a large number of officers from their 'investigation squad' during football matches with Manchester United and Celtic. F.C.. These officers are deployed to monitor the behaviour of fans across the city operating in small teams in standard uniform while engaging in high levels of positive interaction with fans (see figure 2). The senior officer from the squad is also operational on the ground constantly monitoring events, interacting with fans and communicating with his team through radio and mobile phone. If and when factors of 'risk' are identified the senior officer is then able to immediately respond and target the emergent risk at an early opportunity. In all observed cases this early response has dealt with the problem and avoided both the deployment of 'riot' squads or any escalation of the level of 'risk' posed by the situation.



Figure 2: Police officers in standard uniform engaged in positive interpersonal interaction with Celtic fans prior to their U.E.F.A. semi final match against F.C. Boavista.

Finally, a friendly international match between Holland and England provides a neat example of the importance of targeted intervention and immediate de-escalation in situations of increasing 'risk'. As the kick off approached a queue of approximately five hundred England fans developed around the entry point to the stadium. At this time some England fans entered the stadium and released an exit gate allowing access to ticketless fans. Some fans attempted to force their way through this now open exit gate. Very quickly a 'riot' squad that was previously out of sight was deployed to protect and close the exit gate. Some fans attempted to resist this intervention. Officers from the 'riot' squad formed a cordon and raised their batons toward those fans at the front of the crowd but did not strike any of them. They then stepped back a short distance and this had the effect of drawing those individuals actively seeking confrontation out from the wider body of the crowd making them easily identifiable. Almost immediately an arrest squad (officers in plain clothing) ran in from the side and grabbed those few individuals obviously seeking confrontation pushing them through and behind the 'riot' squad who then subsequently reformed their cordon. The gate was secured and within minutes officers from the 'riot' squad conducted a 'staged' withdrawal and the situation calmed. Those fans remaining in the queue outside the stadium all subsequently gained entry through the turnstiles indicating their possession of a valid ticket. Had intervention not been suitably targeted and instead directed to the wider crowd it is likely that it would have been seen as inappropriate and led to a wider escalation of 'risk'.

Principles of crowd management.

The data obtained from the current research is entirely consistent with a wider body of research on the psychology of 'riots' both inside and outside the context of football. This research has recently been distilled into a set of principles of crowd management. The first is the principle of intelligence which requires not just a focus on the identification of known 'prominents' (category B and C fans) but also educating operational police officers about the background culture of fans. The second is facilitation whereby the operation is focused upon facilitating the legitimate intentions and lawful intentions of fans that are present. Third is communication in which every effort is made to communicate with fans about the nature of the situation and the intention of police deployments. The final principle is differentiation such that should intervention be necessary every effort is made to ensure that it is appropriately targeted toward those fans actively seeking conflict. There are also some additional principles that emerge from our research. Public order policing has to be underpinned by a 'philosophy' or theory of crowd control that in turn translates itself into specific forms of operational structure and tactical deployment. Our research indicates that the differences between public order philosophies occur on at least three important dimensions.

The first of these is how the hosting of football fans is understood; are fans seen as tourists or as a public order problem. There is no doubt that the hosting of football fans can be of considerable economic benefit to a host city (given expenditure on accommodation, food and drinks alone) when balanced against the associated costs of any public order operation. However, by concentrating on fans as tourists police operational deployment (and infrastructure) will more easily be oriented toward facilitating the aims of fans who have travelled with these legitimate intentions. In contrast the view of football fans as a problem may lead more easily into forms of policing that are unnecessarily coercive and do not correspond to the levels of risk the overwhelming majority of fans actually pose.

The second is the related issue of the priority given to security over and above safety. On many occasions we have observed situations in which control has been exerted in a way that has severely compromised the safety of the entire crowd, even when the available evidence is that the crowd itself poses a relatively low risk to public order. Indeed, it is this exercise of control that itself has functioned to increase the levels of risk. An example that helps to make this issue more concrete involved fans attending a Champions League match between OSC Lille and Manchester United in Lens. Following the match approximately 500 officers in full 'riot' gear with shields raised, visors down and batons drawn were deployed to hold approximately 3,500 United fans in the stadium. On being released the fans were herded together behind a high gate, which caused considerably dense crowding, and then released en masse down a narrow, steep and poorly lit pathway that was poor underfoot (gravel as opposed to tarmac). Had anyone slipped and fallen over the momentum of the crowd alone meant that there was a clear risk that they would have been injured. Thus, the situation was such that security issues were taking a priority over public safety issues and it is our contention that this contributes to an increase in the overall levels of 'risk'.

Finally, there is of how a police operation defines and understands 'risk'. Here the central distinction may be between defining risk in terms of the presence of known prominents (category B or C fans) regardless of their actual behaviour and intentions within a situation. This is contrasted with operational philosophies that orient themselves toward defining risk in terms of 'behavioural limits'. These latter philosophies tend to define 'risk' in terms of an evidence based approach. Fans are judged in terms of the behaviour they actually exhibit in the situation in which

they are being policed. Consequently, known prominents who are behaving acceptably during an event are made welcome and their legitimate behaviour is facilitated. Whereas, ordinary fans (i.e. with no known history of involvement in 'disorder') who act in an anti-social manner are controlled. In other words, by defining 'risk' in terms of actual behaviour, one can define the limits of tolerance and orient the operation more effectively to those actually approaching tolerance limits rather than at those who are actually behaving in legitimate ways in the specific circumstance.

Models of good practice: operational deployment.

Our research therefore provides an opportunity to begin to discuss issues of operational deployment and training. In what ways can public order policing operations be structured and in what ways can tactics be developed to utilise the kinds of effective practice that have been observed?

Firstly, the initial stage of the operation involves background preparation which should be characterised by research on the background culture of the fan group that is to be policed. What kinds of behaviours do they engage in? What will be their primary legitimate motivations and intentions? What are their sensitivities? What styles of policing are fans used to in their domestic context? This understanding of fan culture should then be 'mapped' onto the local context. Where will fans be likely to gather? What kinds of things will they be likely to do in these situations? How will this impact upon the local community and infra structure? And most importantly how can the situation be organised to facilitate the fans legitimate intentions? Having done this one can begin to predict potential problems and engage in activity that undermines this potential 'risk'.

A good example is provided by a UEFA cup match between PSV Eindhoven and Leeds Utd. Prior to the match channels of communication were established between a Leeds fan project (Leeds Fans Forum) and the local police commander. This channel of communication led the local police to understand the potential animosity between Leeds fans and the local Turkish immigrant population as a result of the recent murder of a Leeds fan in Istanbul. Consequently, channels of communication were established with the local Turkish community leaders and work was done to ensure that potentially confrontational Turkish youth stayed away from the City centre during the visit of Leeds fans. Moreover, through setting up channels of communication between the Police and visiting fans, the local commander was able to increase his ability to assess and validate any potential 'risk' and to communicate with fans should the need arise. This process of 'validation' through the involvement of fan organisations is far from trivial since it helps to develop confidence among local commanders that in potentially high risk situations (as almost all matches involving English sides seem to be defined) that their assessment of low risk is correct and that therefore 'high' profile deployments are not made inappropriately.

The second stage involves initial contact with the masse of visiting fans a stage which should be characterised by low impact visibility, information gathering and monitoring. This initial contact stage is very important for setting the overall 'tone' of relationships between the local police and fans. It should be seen as an opportunity to define the positive intention of the police to facilitate the legitimate behaviour of fans and to undermine those fans who are seeking to be disruptive and confrontational. Police officers should be deployed in pairs or in small groups in standard uniform (if 'riot' squad officers are being used they should be deployed without helmets or shields and with batons sheathed). They should be instructed to engage in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with fans (this would include non-verbal posture, smiles, nods, accommodating requests for photographs etc.). Where language is not a barrier officers should try to interact with fans to gather information with them about their status, motives and intentions (for example, an officer might ask fans: if they have valid tickets; if they are staying inside or outside the city). Such interaction also provides an opportunity to communicate with fans about the behaviours that are acceptable and the nature of tolerance limits. There are solid operational reasons for this positive interpersonal interaction. First, despite the fact that the police force holds specific intentions at an operational level it is individual officers through their interpersonal interaction on the ground that will define the nature of the relationship between the police and fans. It is therefore essential that these interpersonal interactions are consistent with operational policy – even minor transgressions can set in motion a negative representation of the police among fans that can raise the level of 'risk'. Secondly, interpersonal interaction allows officers to gather information that will assist in the valid identification and assessment of risk.

There will be, of course, situations in which risk increases. Depending upon the nature of, and factors causing, this increased risk certain forms of 'escalation' in operational deployment appear to be effective at managing and undermining 'risk'. This second stage should be characterised by the firm communication of tolerance limits and some increased visibility. Certainly officers monitoring fan behaviour will have identified behaviour among fans that poses a potential 'risk' to public order. Should this be the case there should be firstly some attempt to validate this factor as a source of risk. This validation should if possible involve the visiting police force because often they will

have the necessary experience and understanding to validate the host forces assessment. Moreover, they should be made aware of these risk factors for assessment in future situations. Should the increasing level of risk be validated a process of communication should be engaged in with those fans posing 'risk' in their own language to assist in defining the situation for those and other fans (i.e. so those present understand the police awareness of the increasing risk) and to communicate to them the fact that they are approaching the tolerance limits. Every effort should be made during this stage to identify and gather evidence about any individual engaging in criminal activity. Moreover, those fans acting legitimately should be allowed to leave and the group should be allowed some time to exert 'self policing' (i.e. fans within the group may well begin to control those fans approaching the tolerance limits). There may also be some value in increasing the visibility of the police force at this time, perhaps in the form of the visible deployment of a 'riot' squad in standard uniform (i.e. not at this stage wearing helmets or holding shields and batons in sheaths).

Should these measures not deal with the situation then further escalation may be required. This stage is normally characterised by targeted intervention and the removal of situationally defined factors of risk. The objective of police deployment is to minimise 'risk' and it is therefore essential that at this stage actions are not conducted that actually serve to escalate that 'risk'. Therefore, as this escalation takes place it is essential that information is gathered about which individuals or groups are posing the risk and this is communicated clearly to the 'riot' squads that are being deployed. It is simply not sufficient to say that a whole 'crowd' of fans is posing the risk unless there is clear situationally derived evidence that this is the case. Our research indicates that within 'crowds' of fans there will be those who have no intention of engaging in 'disorder' and it is therefore important that intervention is targeted correctly at those fans actually posing the 'risk' to disorder. Inappropriate interventions will actually increase the levels of risk posed by fans in that situation. Given that any intervention will be evidence led and specifically targeted it should be able to remove those fans posing a risk to public order. Having achieved this then there should be an early removal of 'riot' officers and a restoration of normal level policing. Beyond this, of course, there are further options available such as tear gas, rubber bullets or CS spray. This research has yet to witness a situation in which such weaponry has been used appropriately or effectively.

It is important to note that sometimes the increase in risk is not always due to the activity of 'hooligan' fans. For example, at the match between Ajax and Arsenal discussed above a substantial build up of fans occurred at the turnstiles. As the kick off was only a few minutes away fans became agitated as they saw the build up as an outcome of excessive security measures. In fact it was in part due to the way English fans tend to arrive late at the ground and the cumbersome entry system which required fans to enter their ticket into a bar code reader which tends to breakdown under pressure. The fans had not been told to arrive early at the ground and had not been informed about so did not know how to use the bar code reader. Moreover, many fans had kept their tickets in back pockets such that they had become creased making the bar code reader even less functional. As the fans became agitated one fan climbed onto the turnstile and others began to shout, scream and complain about crushing. The police response was to deploy a 'riot' squad. This simply served to provoke fans and increase the risk posed by the situation. None the less the fans eventually progressed through the turnstiles and the situation calmed. One fan was ejected. A more effective response may have been to use an available loud hailer system to communicate with fans about the nature of the situation, to require them to stop pushing as it was causing a crush and to explain to them that it was too dangerous to simply open the gates. However, certain predictions about late arrival could have been developed had adequate research been conducted and communication made to the fans prior to their arrival about potential difficulties at the entry point. Had this been undertaken it may well have been that the situation of increased risk would simply not have occurred.

International police cooperation.

An important aspect of our research has focused upon the nature and role of international police co-operation. Clear and important differences exist in the ways in which visiting police forces are, structured, accommodated and used by host police forces and this is an inconsistency that our research suggests contributes directly to risk. In certain cases policing operations are very similar in terms of the kinds of roles and structures used in operational deployment. These structures allow visiting police officers to play a football intelligence role in combination with the host force. Such well 'meshed' structures and role are efficient at identifying and validating risk and responding appropriately and quickly to it. At other times we have observed events during which local commanders have been resistant to accepting information given to them by visiting police officers about the kinds of 'risk' posed by visiting fan groups. This failure to accept an operational role for the visiting force contributed directly to a breakdown in communications and a significant increase in the risks posed by the event. Indeed, often U.K. forces attached to various club spend much of their time trying to convince host police forces that the visiting fan base does not pose a high risk to public order. However, we have witnessed visiting policing operations that provide no resources for operational deployment. Again our research suggests that this is a problem not least of

all because of the way such officers need to develop an intimate understanding of the fan group and this can only come through consistent contact over time in differing locations. Moreover, the role of visiting teams should not only be viewed as one of 'spotting prominents' but also of providing the host operation with a basis for cultural understanding of the fan base and of validating the ongoing and continuous assessment of risk.

Training.

Our research also has implications for training at both a senior and a junior level. For senior officers training should be provided in operational briefing. Such training should teach senior officers to brief in ways that provide the latest information to officers in a manner that makes them fully aware of the operational goals. Moreover, training should be provided in assisting senior officers in translating operational goals into specific instructions on how officers should actually behave on the ground. For example, during Euro2000 a 'behavioural profile' was developed that instructed officers on the kinds of positive interpersonal behaviours that they should engage in when interacting with fans. These profiles were then given in all operational briefings prior to deployment. Training could also be provided in developing briefings that make officers aware of their role in gathering information, in communicating the cultural norms of the fan groups and what does and does not constitute 'risk'. Such briefings should ensure that officers are left with a secure sense of their own safety whilst maintaining a clear sense of their role in shaping the overall dynamics of the operation.

Training could also be developed using differing scenarios whereby the principles of operational philosophy are mapped onto a developing series of events. Whilst this is already common practice we would urge the development of more realistic scenarios. Often senior officers are presented with a developing series of events in an almost cataclysmic manner in which nothing the senior officers do seems to deal with the escalating problem. Perhaps one way forward might be to use the principles emerging from our research to develop scenarios in which, if the right things are done, very positive outcomes can be achieved. Such training would provide senior officers with the ability to properly assess and respond to differing levels of risk. Moreover, often the focus of such training is on the stadiums whereas in reality the 'disorder' witnessed at major tournaments actually occurs away from stadiums, sometimes in other cities.

There are also various ways in which the training of junior officers could be developed. They already will be receiving substantial training in tactical deployments during crowd events where the focus will be upon aggressive assertion. Our research suggests that there is a need to develop this training to include other forms of behaviour that will allow them to act in less aggressive but equally assertive ways. Officers could be trained in methods of positive interpersonal interaction. Officers should also be trained in techniques of non-aggressive assertion and communicating and imposing tolerance limits. As we have discussed above this aspect of officer behaviour can play a very important role in the dynamics of public order operations and much can be done to develop such skills in officers deployed on the ground during such events. Training should also be developed in understanding emerging risk in situations where the officers are policing crowds of foreign nationals. This training can be done in various ways but one suggestion might be to develop videos as was done around Euro2000. A first video provided general information about the tournament. A second video was designed to emphasise the importance of police public interactions and how personal behaviour by individual officers can set in motion dynamics that have very important consequences for the escalation of conflict. A third video focused upon the issue of how officers might respond when limits are transgressed with an emphasis upon how these transgressions should be managed by being assertive but in a non-confrontational manner. In many ways these videos were simply trying to get officers to behave as they would as normal police officers but in crowd situations.

Finally training should be developed among intervention squads to developing techniques that allow for differentiated interventions. Since it is so important to target risk precisely officers must have tactics available to them that assist in identify and targeting risk. The example of the deployment of the 'riot' squad at the match between Holland and England provides a useful model. Here intervention was managed in such a way as the draw out those fans actively seeking conflict who were then easily targeted and withdrawn. The neat thing about this example was that although an intervention squad was used with baton and shields to intervene in a conflict situation no one was actually struck with a baton and the risk factors were removed in such a way as to deal with the situation. It would be beneficial to develop such tactics and to build them into public order training throughout the E.U.. Such interventions contrast neatly with those around England fans in Zurich and Lichtenstein where 'riot' squads were used extensively but fans were able to engage in a great deal of 'disorder' in highly visible ways without being arrested.

Euro 2004.

The research we have been conducted has considerable implications for the planning of safety and security at major international tournaments such as Euro2004. We believe that the research we have been conducting will be of practical benefit in at least the following areas. Firstly, identifying potential security issues relating to the tournament. Secondly, developing public order philosophy, operational strategy and tactical principles. Thirdly, understanding how such philosophy, strategy and tactics can be applied in different local contexts. Fourth, identifying specific training requirements. Finally, there can be no doubt that in one way or another Euro2004 will leave a legacy in relationship to safety and security issues. It is our hope that our research can assist in developing the understanding and management of the risks posed during the tournament. Moreover, that through close cooperation that the planning and development of security at Euro2004 can act as the framework for addressing and implementing strategies of risk management at all future international tournaments. In this way Euro2004 should be seen as a real opportunity to move European football closer toward the kind of trouble free event witnessed Japan in 2002.